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INTRODUCTION

In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobelman), 1 the

Supreme Court decided the question of just how much special protection
home mortgage lenders are entitled to receive under a provision of the

Bankruptcy Code.2 That provision allows debtors in Chapter 13 proceedings3 to modify the rights of any secured creditor except a mortgage
lender with a lien on the debtor's home.4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits: The Second, Third,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had adopted a reading of 11 U.S.C.

§ 1322(b)(2) 5 that gave Chapter 13 debtors more leverage in dealing with

home mortgage lenders,6 while the Fifth Circuit had adopted a more restrictive reading.7

In Nobelman the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision,
rejecting the practice of "stripping down" home mortgage liens in Chap-

ter 13 bankruptcy cases. "Lien stripping" is a particular form of relief
authorized by the Bankruptcy Code: When the amount owed to a secured creditor exceeds the current value of the collateral, lien stripping
1. 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
2. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-56 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988). Unlike Chapter 7 proceedings, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766
(1988), which are designed to liquidate a debtor's nonexempt assets and distribute the proceeds
to creditors, Chapter 13 proceedings are rehabilitative in that the debtor proposes to fund a
payment plan lasting three to five years out of current earnings with a view toward keeping
some nonexempt property and increasing the return paid to the creditors in bankruptcy.
4. The specific section at issue, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988), governs the contents of a
plan and in part provides that the plan may "modify the rights of holders of secured claims,
other than a claim secured only by a security interest in realproperty that is the debtor'sprincipal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any
class of claims." Id. (emphasis added). The issue presented in Nobelman regarded the interplay of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988)-which governs the valuation of collateral and the division
of creditors' claims into secured and unsecured portions based on that valuation-and
§ 1322(b)(2)-which governs the rights of home mortgage lenders as a special category of
secured creditor. See infra part II for a discussion of these statutory provisions.
5. All later section and chapter references are to 11 U.S.C. unless otherwise stated.
6. Under this more liberal reading, Chapter 13 debtors may retain their homes but are
required to repay only a portion of their outstanding mortgage balance; to the extent the mortgage exceeds the current value of the home, the debtors are effectively discharged from repaying the excess amount. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962
F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir.
1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v.
Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom.,
Lomas Mortgage v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. The Fifth Circuit's interpretation required Chapter 13 debtors to repay the full amount
of the mortgage, even if the current fair market value of the property was less than the outstanding mortgage debt. Nobleman [sic] v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman [sic]), 968
F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992).
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permits debtors to retain possession of the collateral while reducing the
amount owed to the value of the collateral securing the debt. The narrow issue decided in Nobelman was whether a homeowner in a Chapter
13 proceeding should be allowed to strip down a lien secured by the
debtor's primary residence. In broader terms the Court resolved the
question of exactly how much special protection Congress intended to
grant home mortgage lenders under the Bankruptcy Code.
In Nobelman the Court engaged in a perfunctory analysis of the
language of the statute. Such a cursory analysis might have been justified
in light of recent Supreme Court bankruptcy cases that held when the
language of the statute is clear, the beginning and end of the interpretive
process is the language of the Bankruptcy Code itself I Yet the language
of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code at issue in Nobelman is not as
simple as the Court seems to suggest. Moreover, the Court has also held
that when statutory language is unclear, resort to the legislative history
of the statute is appropriate.9 A careful analysis of the legislative history
of the two Bankruptcy Code sections at issue in Nobelman, 1° however,
offers no clear answer to the question presented.
Underlying the problems of statutory interpretation raised by
Nobelman is the tension between two competing federal policies: the policy of promoting home ownership and the policy of granting debtors a
fresh start in bankruptcy. Notwithstanding the Court's strained reading
of the Code, the Nobelman opinion does strike a balance between these
policies. That balance, however, tilts in favor of the lenders' perspective
on mortgages and the free flow of credit actively promoted by mortgage
lenders.
8.
United
9.
10.

Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992); Toibb v. Radloff, I IIS. Ct. 2197 (1991);
States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44 (1986).
11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1322(b)(2) (1988).
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The Nobelman case attracted considerable attention among home-

owners, 1 realtors,1 2 mortgage lenders and brokers,' 3 and investors in
markets for mortgage-backed securities. 4 Lenders were concerned that
11. Cramdowns of ResidentialReal Estate Mortgages in Chapter13 Bankruptcies: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts andAdministrativePracticeon the Judiciary U.S. Senate, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1991) (hereinafter Cramdown Hearing] (prepared statement of Henry J.
Sommer, Staff Attorney, Community Legal Services, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) (ability to
"strip down" liens under § 506 is essential in preventing unscrupulous creditors from using
mortgages as security to avoid bankruptcy discharge); Brief of Consumer Education and Protective Association, Ruby Lee Bradley, Ethel Cook, Clifford Moses, and Chapter 13 Trustee
Gary Gaertner as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 56-58, Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106
(No. 92-641) [hereinafter CEPA Brief] (no evidence that lien stripping has reduced availability
of credit in Pennsylvania, where lien stripping was permitted for 10 years).
12. See, e-g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Realtors and the California
Association of Realtors in Support of Respondent at 14, Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (No. 92641) [hereinafter Realtors' Brief] ("Permitting cramdowns could result in serious negative implications for American consumers in general as well as for the residential real estate industry
and the hundreds of thousands of Americans who depend upon that industry for their
livelihood.").
13. See, eg., Cramdown Hearing, supra note 11, at 64 (prepared statement of John P.
Davey, Senior Vice President, Draper & Kramer, speaking for Mortgage Bankers Association
of America) (today's outstanding mortgages were not priced with cramdown in mind; future
homeowners will necessarily absorb the costs); id at 75 (prepared statement of Larry Gilmore,
Chief Executive Officer, Oakwood Acceptance Corporation, on behalf of Manufactured Housing Institute and National Manufactured Housing Federation) (Chapter 13 bankruptcy
cramdown is especially threatening to manufactured housing); id. at 82 (additional submission
of Michael S. Polk, Attorney, Polk, Scheer & Prober, representing lenders in California) (loans
most susceptible to negative effects of Chapter 13 cramdown are governmental program, low
down-payment loans); id at 85 (additional submission of Robert E. McKew, Assistant General Counsel, and Frank M. Salinger, Vice President, American Financial Services Association) (home equity lenders will suffer during times of low real estate values and Chapter 13
debtors will reap windfall in better times); id at 93 (additional submission of Suzanne Hutchinson, Executive Vice President, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America) (debtors will not
receive any immediate relief from cramdown, but lenders will consequently restrict flow of
mortgage money to depressed real estate areas); Brief of American Bankers Association,
American Financial Services Association, and Credit Union National Association as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Respondent at 26-27, Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (No. 92-641) [hereinafter ABA Brief] (legislative history and plain meaning of statute protect primary or secondary mortgage liens from stripdown in Chapter 13); Brief of Mortgage Bankers Association of
America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (No.
92-641) [hereinafter MBA Brief] (prohibition against modification of home mortgage promotes
congressional policy of fostering affordable home financing); Motion for Leave to File Brief
Amicus Curiae of Nationsbane Mortgage Corporation at 19-20, Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106
(No. 92-641) [hereinafter Nationsbane Brief] (stripdown of home mortgages will diminish
availability of residential mortgage funding for individuals of moderate means).
14. See, e.g., Cramdown Hearing, supra note 11, at 26-27 (prepared statement of
Frank Keating, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development)
(Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and Veterans' Administration (VA) will pay mortgage
insurance claims only to extent of cramdown amount if property is subsequently foreclosed,
but Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) remains liable for full amount of
original mortgage to investors in securitized mortgage market); id. at 49 (prepared statement
of Dean S. Cooper, Associate General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation)
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the more generous reading of the statute adopted by the Second, Third,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits would increase the level of losses they incurred from declining property values. Generally, when a home-securing
mortgage is worth less than the outstanding debt, a foreclosing lender
must realize a loss if the proceeds from the foreclosure sale and mortgage
insurance, if any, do not equal the debt. In this case, however, the debtors sought not only a discharge of personal liability for the deficiency,
but also the right to retain possession of their home. The Nobelmans
wanted to force their mortgage lender to realize a loss from the depreciation of their home; in return, they offered to pay the current value of the
property over time. Though the Nobelmans offered to pay the equivalent
of what their property would have realized at a foreclosure sale, the
lender resisted for three reasons: (1) the debtors wanted to repay the
lender in installments rather than in a lump sum; (2) because no foreclosure sale would take place, the lender's loss would not be offset by mortgage insurance; and (3) mortgage lenders were concerned that debtors
would receive a windfall if they could both receive a discharge of the
unsecured portion of the debt and retain the property.
What the Nobelmans were proposing would simply have required
home mortgage lenders to accept the same treatment given any other
secured lender in bankruptcy. Except for home mortgage lenders, virtually all secured creditors in bankruptcy face the possibility of having a
lien stripped down."5 While Congress clearly conferred a special status
on home mortgage lenders compared with other secured lenders, the parties disagreed as to the scope of what was conferred. The Nobelmans
interpreted this special treatment as granting debtors only a limited right
to strip down homestead mortgages, while mortgage lenders interpreted
it as a prohibition on the practice altogether. Had they been successful,
the Nobelmans would have considerably improved their position by
choosing to confront their lender in federal bankruptcy court rather than
16
in state court.
The litigation in Nobelman purported to clarify the rights and obligations that had been fixed in 1978 when the current Bankruptcy Code
took effect. However, much of the controversy surrounding the
(cramdown is "grossly unfair" to providers of mortgage credit and provides windfall to Chapter 13 debtors in depressed market because they alone enjoy benefit of subsequent appreciation
when market conditions improve); Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation in Support of Respondent at 25-26, Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (No. 92-641)
[hereinafter FHLMC Brief] (lien stripping would significantly disrupt mortgage markets and
sharply curtail access to credit among riskier applicants).
15. See infra part IV.C for a discussion of different cramdown standards.
16. See infra part IV.B for a discussion of state antideficiency laws.
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Nobelman case had its roots in more recent changing conditions in housing markets. 7 Starting in the mid-1980s and continuing through the
present, booming real estate markets went bust in several different regions of the country, leaving both home mortgagors and mortgagees facing substantial losses. The rising volume of bankruptcy litigation
involving stripping home mortgage liens in part reflected this larger
struggle among all the parties investing in residential real estate to avoid
as large a share of these losses as possible. Mortgage lenders argued in
Nobelman, 8 and before Congress, 19 that shifting the costs of declining
property values from borrowers to lenders would produce a plethora of
undesirable consequences without any tangible benefits for borrowers.
The Nobelmans and consumers' rights advocates argued that allowing
debtors in Chapter 13 a limited right to strip home mortgage liens was
necessary to protect the full benefit of a debtor's discharge in
20
bankruptcy.
This Article first examines the Supreme Court's holding in
Nobelman. Part II reviews the various statutory interpretations and
bankruptcy policy arguments marshaled by both debtors and creditors
regarding the permissibility of stripping home mortages under the Bankruptcy Code. Part III discusses the issue of lien stripping as addressed in
the bankruptcy reform legislation introduced in Congress in 1992 and
1993. Part IV of this Article reviews other similar forms of debtor relief
in order to evaluate creditors' claims that lien stripping would disrupt
credit markets and impair the free flow of credit to borrowers. The
forms of debtor relief considered include state antideficiency laws, stripping down real property liens in Chapter 11 and 12 bankruptcy proceedings, and stripping down other liens on real and personal property in
Chapter 13 proceedings.
17. The primary focus of this Article is on conditions in markets for purchase-money
home mortgages secured by first liens on the collateral. The issues raised by nonpurchase
money junior liens are discussed briefly infra part IV.A.3.
18. Brief on the Merits for Respondent, American Savings Bank, N.A., Nobelman, 113 S.
Ct. 2106 (No. 92-641) [hereinafter ASB Brief] (lien stripping provides debtor with windfall
without furthering debtor's fresh start); Brief of the State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (No. 92-641) [hereinafter Alaska Brief]
(Alaska's experience with real estate boom, bust, and subsequent recovery shows how lien
stripping can produce penalty for mortgage lender and windfall for debtor); ABA Brief, supra
note 13; MBA Brief, supra note 13; Nationsbanc Brief, supra note 13; FHLMC Brief, supra
note 14.
19. Cramdown Hearing,supra note 11, at 40-41.
20. Brief on the Merits for Petitioners, Leonard Nobelman and Harriet Nobelman at 7-8,
Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (No. 92-641) [hereinafter Petitioner Brief]; CEPA Brief, supra note
11, at 34.
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II.

THE NOBELMAN LITIGATION

A. Statement of the Case
On June 21, 1984, Leonard and Harriet Nobelman purchased a con-

dominium in Dallas, Texas with an adjustable rate, thirty-year mortgage
of $68,500 provided by American Savings Bank, N.A. (ASB). 21 In 1984
the market for real estate in Dallas was booming: Housing costs were
soaring, and condominiums, or condos, were popular as a moderately
priced alternative to single family homes. Unfortunately for the
Nobelmans, boom turned to bust in late 1985, when housing prices plummeted in Texas and throughout the oil-producing regions in the southern
and western United States.22 Condominium prices were among the hard23
est hit.

The Nobelmans began experiencing financial problems in the late
1980s when Harriet Nobelman lost her job and Leonard Nobelman was
unable to work because of illness.24 Starting in 1989, the Nobelmans
tried unsuccessfully to renegotiate the terms of their mortgage with their
lender. In 1990, after those negotiations failed, the Nobelmans began
withholding mortgage payments and the lender retaliated by posting the
condo for foreclosure.2 5 By October 25, 1990, when the Nobelmans filed
their Chapter 13 plan, the fair market value of their condominium was
only $23,500, approximately one-third of the purchase price.2 6
In the popular vernacular, their mortgage was "upside down"'2 7 or
"underwater" 28 because the debt exceeded the value of the property. The
21. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
22. Robert Reinhold, Texas in a Tailspin, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1986, § 6, at 22.
23. This was due to a variety of factors, such as more severe overbuilding of condominiums than other types of residences and fraudulent practices by principals of condominium
developments that artificially inflated prices. See, eg., Rick Calvelli, Flimfiams and Real Estate SCams, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 31. In addition, because large numbers of
condominiums were only purchased as investments, many investors abandoned their units after price declines and unfavorable changes in tax laws governing such investments, leaving
maintenance costs for an entire development on a shrinking number of resident owners. Under
such circumstances, further declines in value are attributable in part to the inability of the
remaining homeowners to maintain the development.
24. Steve McGonigle, PairLose Court Fight over Condo, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June
2, 1993, at IA.
25. Id. The Nobelmans dealt with the Murray Mortgage Company, the authorized servicing agent for ASB. See infra part IV.B.1 for a discussion of the secondary mortgage market.
26. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2107.
27. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Steve Brown, Rates and Balances; Negative Equity Leaves
Homeowners in Money Pit, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 28, 1993, at 1H.
28. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 112 S. Ct. 773, 782 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(referring to undersecured portion of claim secured by lien on real estate as "so-called 'under-

water' portion of the lien").
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Nobelmans had become "condo slaves," 29 unable to sell their condomin-

ium-or even refinance their mortgage at a lower interest rate and reduce their monthly payments-because they could not cover the shortfall
between the outstanding mortgage and the current market value.

Although precipitous, the decline in value of the Nobelmans' home was
hardly unique or even unusual.3 0 An attorney for the Nobelmans estimated that the value of the property had further declined to only $19,000
by the time the case reached the Supreme Court in 1993.31
By filing under Chapter 13 rather than under Chapter 7 of the Bank-

ruptcy Code, the Nobelmans were seeking the right to restructure their
mortgage obligation to ASB. While Chapter 7 debtors receive a prompt

discharge of most of their debts in exchange for turning over their nonexempt property and are not obligated to pay most creditors after filing,
they enjoy considerably less leverage with secured creditors, including
home mortgage lenders, than do Chapter 13 debtors.32 By contrast,
Chapter 13 debtors must submit to several onerous conditions to qualify
for a discharge, such as proposing a three-to-five-year plan under which

they use all their disposable income to pay their creditors. However, in
return, they are given considerable leverage in bargaining with some of
their secured creditors.33
Under the terms of their proposed Chapter 13 plan, the Nobelmans
sought to retain possession of the condominium while reducing, or
"stripping down," their mortgage debt from the outstanding balance of
$71,335.04 to an amount equal to the fair market value of the property.3 a
In order to accomplish this, the Nobelimans wanted to "bifurcate" ASB's
claim into secured and unsecured portions. 35 The Nobelmans could then
propose a plan that would pay ASB the present value of the secured
claim but pay little or nothing of the unsecured claim. 36 If the
29. Scott Burns, FHA/VA Refinancing Gets Cheaper, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 16,
1993, at 1H.
30. Single-family home prices in Houston were lower in 1992 than they were in 1982. Rob
Norton, What Will Your House Be Worth?, FORTUNE, Sept. 7, 1992, at 62.

31. Interview with Philip I. Palmer, Jr., Counsel of Record for Leonard & Harriet
Nobelman, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 10, 1993).
32. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 724, 727 (1988).
33. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(5), 1325(a)(5), 1325(b) (1988). The Chapter 13 provisions governing the rights of debtors to modify the rights of secured creditors generally are discussed in
detail infra part IV.C.3.
34. Nobelman, 113 S.Ct. at 2107.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
36. Bankruptcy courts in the Northern District of Texas routinely confirm Chapter 13
plans that offer little or no payments to unsecured creditors. By contrast, in other jurisdictions, bankruptcy judges may refuse to confirm plans that do not offer substantial payments to
unsecured creditors. See, eg., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Demographics of Bankruptcy Practice,
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Nobelmans had been successful in bifurcating ASB's claim and stripping
ASB's mortgage lien, they would have been able to keep their condominium after paying off only the secured claim of $23,500. The Nobelmans
offered to continue making the same monthly payments, but only until
the value of the secured claim had been paid in full with interest. 37 The
plan of reorganization provided that ASB would receive no payments on
the "stripped" portion of the loan-roughly $41,000-and that the
Nobelmans would be discharged of their personal liability for that
amount.3 8
ASB successfully challenged the Nobelmans' attempt to bifurcate its
claim and strip its lien, first in the bankruptcy court,39 then on appeal to
U.S. District Court,4° and next in the Fifth Circuit.41 When the Fifth
Circuit denied the Nobelmans the right to bifurcate and strip down their
home mortgage obligation in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, however, it created a split in the circuits: The Second,42 Third,43 Ninth,"
and Tenth Circuits45 had all upheld that right. The Nobelmans petitioned the Supreme Court to determine the validity of lien stripping
under Chapter 13. In order to resolve the split in the circuits, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the Nobelmans' case, 46 and on June 1,
1993 unanimously held in favor of ASB.4 7
B.

The Supreme Court Opinion

In the opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court focused on preserving the in rem rights of the secured creditor, but did not articulate a
63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289, 301 (1989) (documenting large local variations in bankruptcy
practice).
37. Debtor's Modified Chapter 13 Plan and Motion for Valuation, In re Nobelman, No.
390-35116-HCA-13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 1991).
38. In addition, the Nobelmans sought to pay off the arrearages on their mortgage in the
amount of $6577.38 over the three-year term of their proposed plan. Id.
39. In re Nobelman, No. 390-35116-HCA-13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 1991).
40. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 129 B.R. 98 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
41. Nobleman [sic] v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1992).
42. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.
1992).
43. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990) (section
506(a) limits secured claim to fair market value and only secured claim is protected under
§ 1322(b)(2)), aff'd sub nom., Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Sav., 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992).
44. Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989),
aff'd sub nom, Lomas Mortgage v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992).
45. Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991).
46. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
47. Id at 2108.
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coherent theory of bankruptcy policy to justify its holding. 4 Although
the holding in Nobelman is consistent with a theory of bankruptcy law
that curtails the debtor's "fresh start" in order to preserve the creditor's
state law entitlements to the greatest degree possible, the case is not explicitly grounded in such an interpretation of bankruptcy law and policy.
Justice Thomas instead justified his reading of § 1322(b)(2) by contrasting "property" rights that are not subject to modification with "contractual" rights that may be affected by the bankruptcy, and by pointing out
the practical problems of administering the relief sought by the
petitioners.4 9
The Nobelmans and their amici argued that because the Bankruptcy
Code should be construed as a whole, and because as a definitional matter § 506(a) equates any reference to "secured claim" with "collateral
value," a more liberal reading of § 1322(b)(2) was appropriate.5 0 The
petitioners also argued that § 506(a) operated automatically to bifurcate
ASB's claim into secured and unsecured portions, and that, as a result,
the "antimodification" provisions of § 1322(b)(2) applied only to the secured portion of the claim." In addition, the Nobelmans pointed out
that while Congress intended to favor home mortgage lenders, it remained unclear exactly how much preferential treatment Congress intended to confer. Moreover, they argued that preserving the lender's
contractual rights to a particular interest rate and monthly repayment
amount might conform with congressional intent, notwithstanding the
reduction in value of the lien to the current value of the collateral. 2 Finally, the petitioners raised policy issues favoring lien stripping, pointing
out that (1) the debtors offered the mortgage lender as much as the
lender could hope to realize through foreclosure, and (2) any potential
windfall debtors could receive if property values recovered after the strip
down was speculative at best. 3
48. A coherent theory would relate the rights of secured lenders to the objectives of bankruptcy generally, such as by treating secured status as just another form of priority in bankruptcy, not unlike the priority accorded administrative expenses or certain taxes, or arguing
that bankruptcy law should be fundamentally procedural rather than substantive. See, e.g.,
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 5 (1986). Another
coherent theory might characterize debtor relief in bankruptcy as one element of a broader
social support system softening the stresses placed on individuals by a market economy. TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN AMERICA 328 (1989).
49. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110.
50. Id at 2111.
51. Id. at 2109. Regarding any remaining unsecured portion of the claim, the applicable
protections for creditors are found in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(4) and 1325(b) (1988).
52. Petitioner Brief, supra note 20, at 7.
53. Id at 8.
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Respondent ASB and its supporting amici argued that lien stripping
itself was an impermissible "modification" of the mortgage lender's claim
under § 1322, and that bifurcation into secured and unsecured portions
should not be permitted for such claims.5 4 In addition, ASB claimed that
bifurcation of claims under § 506 was not a self-executing procedure-so
that to permit bifurcation of a home mortgage lender's claim would undermine the antimodification language of Chapter 13.11 As a policy matter, ASB argued that if the Nobelmans were allowed to both strip down
the mortgage lien and remain in possession of their home, they would be
receiving not just a "fresh start" but a windfall at the expense of their
lender.5 6 Finally, ASB argued that the legislative history of § 1322(b)(2)
clearly supported the position they were advocating. 7
1. Statutory interpretation
Justice Thomas looked first at the relationship between 11 U.S.C.

§§ 506(a) and 1322(b)(2). Section 506(a) provides,
[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest... is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property.., and is an unsecured claim to the
extent that the value of such creditor's interest ...is less than
the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in fight of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.5 8
Section 1322(b)(2) provides that a debtor's Chapter 13 plan may "modify
the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of
holders of any class of claims." 59 Justice Thomas noted that the parties
agreed that § 1322(b)(2) applied to the facts of this case, that it "proscribes modification of the rights of a homestead mortgagee" and that the
54. ASB Brief, supra note 18, at 42.

55. Id at 6.
56. Id at 29.
57. Id. at 18-24.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Section 506(a) applies in Chapter 13 by operation of 11 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (1988), which provides that "chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under
chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of this title." Id
59. Id § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
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issue before the Court was whether or not the terms of the Nobelmans'
proposed plan constituted a "modification" of ASB's rights. 6"
In attempting to reconcile the two sections, Justice Thomas first
noted that the antimodification language of § 1322(b)(2) applied to the
"rights of holders" of claims, not to "claims" or "secured claims." 6 1
Conceding that the application of § 506(a) produced secured and unsecured claims, the Court held that determination of secured status did
not necessarily mean that ASB's "rights" were limited by the valuation
of its secured claim.62 In so holding the Court diminished the role of
§ 506(a) as a fulcrum balancing the competing bankruptcy policies of
protecting a secured creditor's state law entitlements and the debtor's
63
fresh start.
It is far from clear as a matter of statutory interpretation that the
focus of § 1322(b)(2) is really on "rights" rather than "secured claims."
Justice Thomas acknowledged that while it is sensible as a matter of
grammar to assume that the phrase "other than" must refer only to "secured claim"-the last two words immediately preceding the commasuch a reading is not compelled as a matter of law by the so-called rule of
the last antecedent." Justice Thomas pointed out that even § 506(a) uses
a parallel construction to the phrase "claim secured by a [homestead
lien]" to refer to both the secured and unsecured portions of an undersecured claim. Another plausible reading of the statute shows that the
last antecedent might be the entire phrase, "rights of holders of secured
claims. ' 65 Yet another reading of the statute could contrast the express
grant of authority to a Chapter 13 debtor to modify the rights of holders
60. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2109.
61. iat at 2111.
62. Id at 2110. Further evidence that the valuation requirement of § 506(a) does not
determine the scope of the prohibition on modification in § 1322(b)(2) is provided by the
choice of the unadorned word "claim" within the "other than" proviso itself. The prohibition
extends to "claims" that are "secured only by a security interest in real property" rather than
to "secured claims." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2); see also ASB Brief, supra note 18, at 20 (contrasting § 1322(b)(2) to original House version that provided that any secured indebtedness
could be modified).
63. Thomas M. Ward, The Supreme Court Diminishes the "Redeeming" Qualities of the
Bankruptcy Code in Dewsnup v. Timm, 1993-1994 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 147, 150.
64. The "rule of the last antecedent" states that a statutory clause should refer to and
modify its immediate antecedent. Thus, in Nobelman, "the operative clause 'other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in... the debtor's principal residence' must be read to
refer to and modify its immediate antecedent, 'secured claims.'" Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)).
65. Id Respondent ASB also suggested that an equally plausible reading of the statute
shows that the last antecedent is the entire phrase, "rights of holders of secured claims." ASB
Brief, supra note 18, at 18.
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of unsecured claims with the prohibition on modification of claims secured by homestead liens to support the conclusion that the antimodification provision applied only to postbifurcation secured claims. Under
this interpretation, holders of claims may have either secured claims that
are protected by the prohibition on modification, or unsecured claims
that can be modified, or some combination of both. This reading shifts
the focus back to the claim itself in determining the scope of
§ 1322(b)(2). Arguably, it also permits § 506(a) to play the role intended
by Congress in mediating the interests of secured creditors, unsecured
6
creditors, and debtors.
However, when Congress intended to protect creditors or their
rights as opposed to claims, its intent was clearly expressed.6 7 For example, § 509, which deals with the claims of codebtors, provides that codebtors are subrogated to the "rights of such creditor" to the extent that
the cocqebtor has paid the claim of the creditor.6 8 Similarly, under § 523
creditors must follow particular procedures in order to except from discharge certain types of debts owed to them. 9
Justice Thomas decided that because the term "rights," unlike the
term "secured claim," is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, it was
necessary to turn to nonbankruptcy law to clarify the substance of these
rights.70 This approach is consistent with that used in Dewsnup v. Timm
(In re Dewsnup),7 1 the widely criticized 72 opinion that the Court handed
down last year. In Dewsnup, the Court ruled that debtors had no right to
strip down liens on real property in Chapter 7 proceedings. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, adopted a rather strained interpretation of two subsections of the Bankruptcy Code.7" His rationale was to
66. CEPA Brief, supra note 11, at 20.
67. Id. at 22.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 509(a) (1988).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (1988).
70. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110 (citing Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (1992);
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).
71. 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992).
72. See, eg., Patterson v. Shumate (In re Shumate), 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2251 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating that consistency of usage within same statute is necessary, or symbol of
law becomes see-saw, not scales); Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 .
BANKR. L. & PRAc. 513 (1992); Ward, supra note 63, at 161.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)-(d) (1988). For the text of § 506(a), see supra note 58 and accompanying text. Section 506(d) provides,
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured claim, such lien is void, unless(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to
file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
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avoid granting debtors in bankruptcy a remedy that was not available
under the prior Bankruptcy Act 74 and was not clearly within the contemplation of the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code. In reaching that interpretation, Justice Blackmun found that the words "allowed secured
claim" did not have the same meaning in § 506(a) and § 506(d), though
he did concede that such an analysis was "not without its difficulty.""5
To support his position he emphasized the importance of the entitlements conferred on creditors under state law, and the need for bankruptcy law to respect the rights of secured creditors in particular, absent
a clear statutory or legislative mandate to the contrary.7 6
The Dewsnup Court held that lien stripping was not available to
Chapter 7 debtors based on sections 506(a) and 506(d) 77 of the Bankruptcy Code.78 The rationales advanced in the Dewsnup opinion for
prohibiting lien stripping in Chapter 7 bankruptcies, however, have little
relevance in the context of rehabilitative bankruptcy proceedings under
Chapters 11, 12, and 13, where Hen stripping is expressly and broadly
permitted, subject only to very minor qualifications. 7 9 The legislative
74. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 62-57, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of primarily 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or Code].
75. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
76. In writing for the majority in Dewsnup, Justice Blackmun adopted the respondent's
argument that "allowed secured claim" is not an indivisible term of art defined by § 506(a),
although noting that this interpretation was "not without its difficulty." Id. at 777-78. The
Court held that in § 506(d), "allowed" refers to "allowed claim" as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 502
(1988), whereas "secured" refers to "secured claim" as defined in § 506(a), and "allowed secured claim" need not be given the same reading in § 506(a) and in § 506(d). Id. at 778. The
rather opaque reasoning of the majority was subjected to scathing criticism in a dissent by
Justice Scalia. Id at 780 (Sealia, J., dissenting).
77. See supra note 73 for the statutory text.
78. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
79. In Dewsnup, the Court addressed the issue of lien stripping in the context of a Chapter
7 case. The holding was limited to interpreting the words "allowed secured claim" as they
appear in sections 506(a) and (d), with the Court expressing no opinion on the meaning of
those words when they appear in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument
illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply
to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow
other facts to await their legal resolution on another day.
Id Several courts have held that Dewsnup does not apply to Chapter 11 cases. See, e.g., 650
Fifth Avenue Assocs. v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (In re 650 Fifth Avenue Assocs.), 156
B.R. 726, 732 n.7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Jones, 152 B.R. 155, 173 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1993); In re Butler, 139 B.R. 258, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1992). But see Blue Pac. Car Wash,
Inc. v. St. Croix County (In re Blue Pac. Car Wash, Inc.), 150 B.R. 434, 435 (W.D. Wis.
1992); Taffi v. United States (In re Tafi), 144 B.R. 105, 113-14 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
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history of the Code makes clear that lien stripping is permitted in the
reorganization chapters.8 0
Given that the antimodification provision of § 1322 was envisioned
as giving mortgage lenders special protection, it would have been somewhat ironic to find that the practical consequence of that special protection was that mortgage lenders were worse off than other secured
creditors: They would be subject to lien stripping, but unable to demand
payment in full within the term of the plan. In addition, Chapter 13 may
not have been intended to subject mortgage lenders to lien stripping because it, unlike state law foreclosure, is not a compensable event recognized by mortgage insurers."1 Thus, mortgage lenders suffer if lien
stripping is permitted in Chapter 13 proceedings, but debtors do not enjoy any immediate benefit because they must continue to make full
monthly payments to the lender at the same interest rate. The only benefit to debtors is that they make the payments for fewer months or years.
Chapter 13 debtors are thus deprived of the usual benefits of "cramming
down"" mortgage lenders.
While the ruling in Nobelman generally prohibits stripping down
homestead liens, the holding leaves open several avenues by which debtors may still be able to cramdown some lenders holding security interests
in their homes. The opinion does not address whether the scope limitation in § 1322(b)(2) limits antimodification protection to mortgages secured solely by a security interest in the debtor's homestead, or whether
the antimodification provision even applies to a junior lien that is wholly
unsecured at the time of filing. Since many outstanding mortgages include language that purports to take a security interest in items such as
rents, royalties, fixtures, or insurance as well as the residence itself, those
mortgages may be outside the protection of the antimodification provision, as are second homes that are not the debtor's principal residence or
homes held for rent. 3 Justice Thomas did not directly address the issue
80. 124 CONG. REC. 32,409, 34,009 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards and Sen. DeConcini,
respectively).
81. Cramdown Hearing,supra note 11, at 26; see also VA Office of General Counsel Precedent 1-91, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,156 (June 3, 1991); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Letter No. 91-27 (June 4, 1991).
82. "Cramdown" is the power of the debtor in bankruptcy to force a class of nonconsenting creditors to accept confirmation of a plan of reorganization so long as the plan meets
certain minimum standards for the treatment of those nonconsenting creditors. DAVID G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 760 (1993). See infra part IV.C.3 for a general discussion of
Chapter 13 cramdown provisions.
83. See, eg., Hammond v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. (In re Hammond), 1993 WL
277546 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1993) (post-Nobelman case holding that "rents, profits and fixtures"
language in mortgage was enough to remove it from § 1322(b)(2) protection); Hirsch v. Cit-
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of junior liens, leaving open the possibility that a completely unsecured

junior lien might still qualify for the special protection of § 1322(b)(2).

4

The Fifth Circuit's Nobelman opinion rejected the reasoning of
other circuit and district courts that held that lien stripping is permissible

for undersecured home mortgages in Chapter 13 because there is no conflict between § 506(a) and § 1322(b)(2).8

The Fifth Circuit held that if a

icorp Mortgage Corp. (In re Hirsch), 155 B.R. 688 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (post-Nobelman
case holding that "rents, issues & profits" language in mortgage was enough to remove it from
§ 1322(b)(2) protection). But see In re Davis, 989 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
mortgage with interest in hazard insurance and "rents, royalties, profits and fixtures" still
qualifies for § 1322(b)(2) protection); In re Foster, 61 B.R. 492 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (stating if additional security is illusory, then mortgage still protected by § 1322(b)(2)).
84. One commentator has argued, however, that if a junior mortgage was wholly unsecured both at the time it attached and at the time the bankruptcy proceeding commenced,
then there is no "secured claim" for § 1322(b)(2) to protect. Consumer Issues in Bankruptcy
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Economic and CommercialLaw of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1992) (statement of Henry J. Sommer on behalf of National
Bankruptcy Conference); National Consumer Law Ctr., Inc., Homeowners Get No Break:
Supreme Court Makes It Harderto Save a Home in Bankruptcy, 11 NCLC REPORTS, BANKR.
& FORECLOSURES ED. 21, 23 (1993). See infra part IV.A.3 for a general discussion of junior
lien issues.
85. The following lower courts permitted lien stripping: Richards v. Citicorp Mortgage,
Inc. (In re Richards), 151 B.R. 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re Cardinale, 142 B.R. 42 (Bankr
D.R.I. 1992); In re Govan, 139 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1992); In re Sainz-Dean, 139
B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Colo.), aff'd sub nom., United Planters Nat'l Bank v. Sainz-Dean, 143
B.R. 784 (D. Colo. 1992); Taras v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Taras), 136 B.R.
941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Torrez Lopez, 138 B.R. 348 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1992); In re
Weber, 140 B.R. 707 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992); Franklin v. Union Mortgage Co. (In re Franklin), 126 B.R. 702 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991); Loader v. Charlton Credit Union (In re Loader),
128 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); In re Ward, 129 B.R. 664 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991);
Wright v. C & S Family Credit, Inc. (In re Wright), 128 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991);
Brouse v. CSB Mortgage Corp. (In re Brouse), 110 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re
DiQuinzio, 110 B.R. 628 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); In re Gadson, 114 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1990); Goins v. Diamond Mortgage Corp. (In re Goins), 119 B.R. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990);
In re Hayes, 111 B.R. 924 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990); In re Honett, 116 B.R. 495 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1990); In re Demoff, 109 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Frost, 96 B.R. 804 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1989), aff'd, 123 B.R. 254 (S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Harris, 94 B.R. 832 (D.N.J.
1989); In re Hill, 96 B.R. 809 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Ross, 107 B.R. 759 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1989); Kehm v. Citicorp Homeowners Serv., Inc. (In re Kehm), 90 B.R. 117 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988); Caster v. United States (In re Caster), 77 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Crompton, 73 B.R. 800 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Jablonski, 70 B.R. 381 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987), aff'd in part, 88 B.R. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Simmons, 78 B.R. 300 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1987); Cameron Brown Co. v. Bruce (In re Bruce), 40 B.R. 884 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984);
Spadel v. Household Consumer Discount Co. (In re Spadel), 28 B.R. 537 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1983); and In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
The following courts denied debtors the right to bifurcate and strip home mortgages: In
re Barnes, 146 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992); In re Doss, 143 B.R. 952 (Bankr. E.D.
Okla. 1992); In re Wicks, No. Civ.-91-1983-A, 1992 WL 373162 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 11, 1992),
aff'd sub nom., Independence One Mortgage Corp. v. Wicks (In re Wicks), 1993 WL 377053
(10th Cir. Okla. Sept. 28, 1993); In re Davidoff, 136 B.R. 567 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); In re
Strober, 136 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); Etchin v. Star Servs., Inc. (In re Etchin), 128
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conflict does exist between the general provisions of § 506(a) and the specific provisions of § 1322(b)(2), then the specific provisions of Chapter 13
should prevail. 6 By remaining silent on the issue, Justice Thomas therefore tacitly followed the rule enunciated in other Supreme Court cases:
Where two sections of a statute can be construed harmoniously, then
they are not in conflict.8 7
2.

Modification

Because § 1322(b)(2) prohibits "modification" of the rights of a
mortgage lender with a lien on the debtor's homestead, the Court had to
determine whether lien stripping constitutes "modification." The petitioners in Nobelman argued that they were not modifying the rights of
the mortgage lender because the lender would continue to receive payments in the amount agreed upon under the original contract, but only
until the amount of the allowed secured claim had been paid in full with
interest. Thus, the Nobelmans would stop making their mortgage payments much sooner than provided for in the original loan agreement,
based on a new amortization schedule proposed as part of the plan. One
amicus further observed that if bifurcation of the creditor's claim into
secured and unsecured portions takes place by operation of § 506(a)and not through confirmation of the debtor's plan-then it should not
constitute a modification of the creditor's claim. 88
B.R. 662 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991); In re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); Boullion
v. Sapp (In re Boullion), 123 B.R. 549 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Christiansen, 121 B.R.
63 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Moran, 121 B.R. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990); In re Sauber,
115 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); First Interstate Bank v. Woodall (In re Woodall), 123
B.R. 95 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990), rev'd, 931 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1991); In re Chavez, 117 B.R.
733 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re
Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); Kessler v. Homestead Say. (In re Kessler), 99 B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703 (D.N.D. 1988); In re
Hemsing, 75 B.R. 689 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Smith, 63 B.R. 15 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986);
In re Bradshaw, 56 B.R. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1985); and In re Hildebran, 54 B.R. 585 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1985).
At least one court has tried to combine the two positions, permitting bifurcation of the
mortgage creditor's claim and also holding that the lien passed through the bankruptcy unaffected. In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992), vacated, 153 B.R. 601 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1993).
86. In re Nobleman [sic], 968 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 1992).
87. See, eg., United States v. Nordic Village Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (1992) (different
statutory provisions should be read, where possible, as complementary rather than in conflict
with each other); Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Ry. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S.
490, 510 (1989) (whenever possible, statutes should be construed so as to avoid potential conflict); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (apparently ambiguous language may be clarified when viewed in context of entire statutory
scheme).
88. CEPA Brief, supra note 11, at 37-39.
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The Court's emphasis on the "rights of holders," however, led to an
expansive interpretation of "modification," and a rejection of the
Nobelmans' reasoning. The Court held that protection against modification in § 1322(b)(2) extends to the rights of holders of claims, without
regard to whether those claims are secured or unsecured. 9 Accordingly,
bifurcation of a home mortgage lender's claim into secured and unsecured portions is clearly a "modification" of the lender's rights prohibited by the plain language of § 1322(b)(2).
With regard to formal legal entitlements, lien stripping clearly diminishes the rights of lenders. As one respondent queried in her brief,
what protection against modification would Congress be providing lenders if they were protected against nominal changes in interest rate or
payment amount but not from a more than sixty-five percent reduction in
principal?9 ° However, the rationale for forcing secured lenders other
than home mortgage lenders to accept lien stripping is that it merely
forces them to recognize a changed economic reality-the decline in
value of the collateral. The issue raised in Nobelman is whether forcing
mortgage lenders to recognize a changed economic reality by revising the
legal description of their rights must constitute a "modification" for
bankruptcy purposes.
Citing Dewsnup, Justice Thomas argued that § 1322(b)(2) protects
home mortgage lenders from having the rights "bargained for by the
mortgagor and mortgagee" modified without their consent. 9 1 However,
many provisions of Chapters 1, 3, and 5 alter the rights of home mortgage lenders in Chapter 13 proceedings by operation of law. Justice
Thomas conceded that not all rights of mortgagees survive unaltered in
bankruptcy, 92 pointing out that a secured lender's right to foreclose is
halted by the automatic stay,93 that an undersecured lender's right to
receive interest during the pendency of a reorganization is lost,94 and that
a debtor has the right to cure prepetition defaults and reinstate a mortgage that is already accelerated and due under state law. 95 The issue,
then, is not simply whether such an alteration is possible, but rather the
89. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110.
90. Brief on the Merits for Respondent, Standing Chapter 13 Trustee at 22, Nobelman,
113 S. Ct. 2106 (No. 92-641) [hereinafter Trustee Brief].
91. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110.
92. Id. at 2106 (citing Timbers, 484 U.S. at 369-70); see also Wright v. Vinton Branch of
the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (discussing rights of mortgagees).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
94. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 369-70.
95. Section 1322(b)(5) provides,
Notwithstanding... [§ 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification provisions, a plan may] provide
for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments
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more difficult question of when an alteration of those rights is so great
that it constitutes an impermissible "modification."
The only basis Justice Thomas offered for distinguishing between

permissibly "affecting" a secured creditor's rights and impermissibly
"modifying" them was that "contract" rights and the "power to enforce

[property] rights" can be affected by bankruptcy, but "property" rights
must pass through bankruptcy unaffected. 96 This distinction is con-

clusory at best and is hardly a reasoned analysis of when bankruptcy law
should not be permitted to modify a creditor's state law entitlements.
Moreover, Justice Thomas failed to note that his examples may not prove

the proposition for which he cited them. The operation of the automatic
stay, like bifurcation under § 506(a), modifies the rights of secured credi-

tors by operation of the Bankruptcy Code itself, not through implementation of the debtor's plan of reorganization. 97

Also, again like

bifurcation, the automatic stay was designed to diminish the nonbankruptcy rights of secured creditors in order to improve the position of the
debtor. 98

The problem of defining what constitutes an impermissible "modification" of a home mortgage lender's rights was vigorously debated soon
after the Code was enacted. The issue at that time was the debtor's
power to cure and reinstate a home mortgage under § 1322(b)(5). Mort-

gage lenders argued that once the debt had been accelerated, the debtor
had no way to cure the default under the Bankruptcy Code except to pay

the full amount as required by state law. This was rejected by most
courts as too narrow a reading of "curing any default" and because it
failed to give full import to the "notwithstanding paragraph (2)"
language. 99
while the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last
payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due;...
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
96. Nobelman, 113 S.Ct. at 2110.
97. CEPA Brief, supra note 11, at 36-38. It should be noted, however, that unlike the
automatic stay, bifurcation is achieved through a valuation hearing brought on by a motion of
an interested party. FED. R. BANKR. PROc. 3012.
98. James J. White, The Recent Erosion of the Secured Creditor'sRights Through Cases,
Rules and Statutory Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 53 Mms. L.J. 389, 398-400 (1983).
99. DiPierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Grubbs v.
Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n (In re Houston), 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (cited
by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in Nobelman). The en bane Grubbs opinion overturned
an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion for the mortgage lender on this issue. Grubbs v. Houston First
Am. Say. Ass'n, 718 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1983). Mortgage lenders had more success rejecting
the debtor's attempt to cure if they had already reduced the debtor's liability to judgment
under state law before the bankruptcy proceeding was initiated, with some courts holding that
the debt had been merged into the judgment and so § 1322(b)(5) no longer applied because no
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Bifurcation

Justice Thomas conceded that § 506(a) limits a creditor's secured
claim to an amount equal to the value of the collateral, but denied that
§ 506(a) valuation has any impact on the "rights" of home mortgage
lenders protected by § 1322(b)(2)." ° This narrow reading of § 506(a)
undermines not only the rights of other unsecured creditors, but also
undermines the policy of a "fresh start" for debtors. After Nobelman a
creditor might require a homeowner to grant the lender a mortgage even
if, at the time the loan was made, the borrower had no unencumbered
equity in the property.1"' Such a creditor would later be in a position to
deprive the homeowner of part of the value of a bankruptcy discharge if
the total debt secured by the homestead exceeded the value of the property. A debtor in such a position would be forced to choose between
paying more than the current value of the homestead in order to retain
possession, or surrendering the property in order to receive the full economic benefit of the bankruptcy discharge. Granting a special, privileged
status to junior homestead liens of this type might also disadvantage
other unsecured creditors if all the debtor's disposable income was directed to paying undersecured lienholders in full instead of all unsecured
claims equally.1" 2 This special treatment of financially worthless mortgage liens creates a potential trap for unwary consumer debtors. In so
doing, it contrasts with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that are
designed to preserve the value of the debtor's discharge, such as the special procedures mandated whenever the debtor wishes to reaffirm a
debt,"°3 or the ability of the debtor to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchasemoney liens in household goods.' °4
payments on the debt were due after the plan. See, eg., Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin. Corp.
v. McCurdy (In re McCurdy), 21 B.R. 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). However, other opinions
have held that the debtor may cure and reinstate the mortgage debt right up to the time a
foreclosure sale is held. See, eg., In re Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
849 (1985).
100. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110.
101. This problem rarely arises in Texas because of the general prohibition on granting liens
on a homestead, subject only to three exceptions: purchase-money liens, home-improvement
liens, and tax liens. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 1984
& Supp. 1993). The problem of wholly unsecured junior liens therefore rarely arises in Texas,
although it is a possibility. For example, a lien securing the purchase price of home improvements might be undersecured when it attached and become wholly unsecured following a general decline in house prices.

102. See National Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 84, at 23.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988).

104. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2) (1988). See infra part IV.A.3 for a discussion of the debtor's
ability to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in household goods.
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The importance of forcing undersecured creditors to accept claims
bifurcation, and to limit their right to "adequate protection" to the financial value of the secured portion alone, was recently emphasized by the
Supreme Court in United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood ForestAssociates, Ltd. 105 There, the Court rejected an attempt by undersecured
creditors to receive interest payments on their allowed secured claims
during the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorganization before other unsecured creditors received any payment on their claims.106 In Nobelman
the Court effectively granted the undersecured lender the right to principal as well as interest payments on its unsecured claim before any payment to other unsecured creditors, thereby violating the principal of
equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.10 7
When Congress perceived a conflict between the general requirement of § 506(a)-that claims be treated as secured only to the extent of
the judicially determined value of the collateral-and the specific
requirements of a rehabilitative bankruptcy proceeding, it expressly qualified the application of § 506. Section 111 (b) provides that undersecured, nonrecourse lenders will be treated as having recourse against
the debtor unless they elect to have both the secured and unsecured portions of their claim treated as secured for certain purposes.10 8 Section
1111(b)(2) specifically provides that "if such an election is made, then
notwithstandingsection 506(a) of this title, such claim is a secured claim
to the extent that such claim is allowed. '""°9 Section 1322(b)(2), however, does not refer to § 506(a), nor does it qualify in any way the application of § 506(a) in Chapter 13 plans.
The relationship between the reorganization chapters and § 506 is
not always clear, however, and silence in § 1322(b)(2) is not dispositive
on the issue of congressional intent. Section 1124(1), governing impairment of claims or interests, provides that a Chapter 11 debtor may leave
unaltered the rights of holders of claims.1 10 It does not refer to § 506,
suggesting that § 506(a) bifurcation cannot be as automatic as the petitioners' argument might suggest. Furthermore, the language of § 506(a)
105. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
106. Id.at 381.
107. CEPA Brief, supra note 11, at 54-55.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988). A more detailed discussion of the rights of secured creditors in Chapter 11 proceedings, including the right of certain creditors to make § 1111(b)
elections, is found infra part IV.C.2.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 11l1(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
110. Id. § 1124(1) provides that a class of claims is impaired under a plan unless the plan
"leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or interest
entitles the holder of such claim or interest."
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concerning valuation seems to suggest that an asset might have multiple,
inconsistent valuations during the course of a reorganization proceeding,
making it unclear which value would apply automatically to bifurcate a
claim into secured and unsecured portions.'1 1
4. Discharge
Another weakness in the petitioners' interpretation of § 1322's antimodification provision emerges when the scope of the debtor's discharge is considered. Bankruptcy courts have no power to grant the
Chapter 13 debtor a discharge for personal liability on a debt that is
neither paid in full under the plan nor paid according to the original
terms of the agreement between the debtor and the creditor. Under
§ 1325(a)(5) a debtor may cramdown a secured creditor only by allowing
the creditor to retain its lien and by offering to pay within the plan the
value of the claim. 2 If the debtor can pay the amount of the allowed
secured claim within the three-to-five-year term of a plan, then the
debtor can receive a discharge on any unpaid balance under § 1328.113
As noted by ASB, permitting a mortgagor to make standard contract payments for less than the original term of the loan following bifurcation of the mortgagee's claim arguably frustrates the congressional
intent of the antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2). However, provided all payments on the secured claim are made by the end of the reorganization, such a shortened maturity may still enable the debtor to
receive a discharge on the debt under § 1328(a). On the other hand, if
the debtor proposes to pay the mortgage outside the plan and continues
to make payments beyond the life of the plan, then the court cannot
grant the debtor a discharge of personal liability on that debt. 114 Nevertheless, many debtors have sought to strip down mortgages with maturi111. The relevant language in § 506(a) is "[s]uch value shall be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's
interest." Id. § 506(a).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988) provides that the court shall confirm a plan if,
with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such
claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such
claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder.
Id.
113. Id § 1328 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
114. Id. § 1328(a)(1).
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ties that considerably exceed the term of their proposed Chapter 13
plans, and courts have confirmed these plans despite the plain language
of § 1328(a)(1).' 15 However, this attempt to strip down long-term debts
not fully paid within the term of the plan can effect no more than a mora16
torium on the power of the mortgagee to foreclose, not a discharge.'
Another difficulty with the petitioners' position appears when the
debtor attempts to set up a new amortization schedule that does not
"modify" the contractual rights that even they conceded are protected
under § 1322(b)(2). Even jurisdictions that permitted lien stripping prior
to Nobelman required that debtors continue to make payments in the
amount provided in the original contract, not some lesser amount. As
Justice Thomas noted in the opinion, however, a problem arises when the
original mortgage is not a fixed-rate mortgage, because payment amounts
and the interest rate are subject to modification over the term of the loan,
117
as was the case with the Nobelmans' mortgage.
By broadly interpreting "rights of holders" of claims secured by the
debtor's homestead, Justice Thomas may have done more than prevent
lien stripping. Without a clear standard to determine which rights of
lienholders pass through bankruptcy unaffected, one possible interpretation of Justice Thomas's holding is that the debtor cannot receive a discharge of personal liability for a debt secured by a lien on his or her
homestead. 1 Such a ruling would fly in the face of the clear language of
the Bankruptcy Code.119 The fact that Justice Thomas's reasoning supports such an implausible outcome, however, undermines the credibility
of his interpretation of the language at issue in the case.
C. Legislative History
Justice Thomas analyzed the issues in Nobelman very narrowly,
with nary a mention of the legislative history of either § 506(a) or
§ 1322(b)(2). Justice Stevens filed a concurrence asserting that Justice
Thomas's "literal" reading of the statute was consistent with the legislative history of § 1322(b)(2).12 ° Justice Stevens conceded, however, that
115. See, eg., Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d
176 (2d Cir. 1992).
116. In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364, 370-72 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992), vacated, 153 B.R. 601
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
117. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111; see Trustee Brief, supra note 90, at 22-24.
118. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 58 (rev. ed. 1993); Margaret
Howard, Nobelman v. American Say. Bank: OfLiteralism, Retroactivity and Discharge, 1993
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR 1, 3.
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)-(b) (1988).
120. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2112 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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there was an apparent paradox in requiring the debtor to surrender his or
her homestead while permitting the debtor to strip down liens on other
property, but concluded that the legislative history mandated such a
result. 12 1 His concurrence accepts the interpretation of the legislative
history of § 1322(b)(2) put before the Court by ASB and its amici. However, the legislative history does not support the holding in Nobelman
any more clearly than does the language of the statute.
Some commentators have argued that the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 represented something of a high-water mark of rising popular
and congressional support for debtors, including consumer debtors, and
1 24
23
that since its passage, Congress, 122 state legislatures, and the courts
have gradually undermined many of its more prodebtor provisions. 25
The Nobelman case can be seen as an example of this trend. It is based
on a narrow reading of § 506(a) and § 1322(b)(2) that obscures the extent to which the holding subverts some of the major policy initiatives of
the 1978 reforms. Although the Court failed to analyze the fundamental
bankruptcy policy issues implicated in its decision, its restricted reading
produced a result that is consistent with the broader trend of eroding
those reforms. The Court tacitly rejected the theory that permitting bifurcation of the claims of home mortgage lenders into secured and unsecured claims before applying the special protections of § 1322(b)(2)
would simultaneously preserve both a fresh start for honest debtors and
equal treatment for similarly situated creditors. 12 6
The Court also failed to note that the legislative history is silent on
precisely the point at issue in Nobelman-whether the exclusion from
modification in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan applies before or after bifurcation of the mortgage lender's claim under § 506(a). The legislative history is silent because many of the differences between the Senate and
House versions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 arose in a series of
121. Id. at 2114 (Stevens, J., concurring). See infra part II.C. for discussion of the legislative history.

122. See, eg., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) (substantial abuse); id. § 523(a)(2)(C) (exception to
discharge for luxuries purchased within 40 days of filing); id. § 524(d) (relaxation of reaffirmation provisions); id. § 1328(a) (narrowing Chapter 13 discharge).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) permits states to opt out of the federal exemptions in 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d). By 1993, 36 states had done so. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 522.02, at 522-11
n.4a, 522-12 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993) [hereinafter COLLIER 15].
124. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 392-94 (2d ed. 1991) (stating variations of local legal culture produce large regional
variations in bankruptcy practice, with courts adopting radically differing interpretations of
Bankruptcy Code provisions).
125. White, supra note 98, at 389; Barry L. Zaretsky, Some Limits on Mortgagees'Rightsin
Chapter13, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 433 (1984).
126. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1975).
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informal, unreported compromises entered into with a view toward getting the legislation enacted in the final days of the 95th Congress. Only
certain issues were discussed in depth-such as the status of bankruptcy
judges and the funding of a U.S. trustee system-and the ban on modifications of home mortgages in Chapter 13 proceedings was not among
them.' 27
One of the fundamental objectives of the revision of bankruptcy law
in the 1970s was the reform of the consumer bankruptcy process. Prior
to the enactment of the Code, consumer debtors received little relief in
bankruptcy because security interests encumbered most debtors' assets
and debts often were excepted from discharge or reaffirmed by debtors.12 8 These problems were exacerbated by the lack of effective legal
representation for consumer debtors. 129 The generous cramdown provisions of Chapter 13,130 which granted debtors substantial leverage in restructuring their secured debts, were part of the legislative response to
these problems.
Section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act originally provided that properly perfected liens could not be affected in bankruptcy proceedings.' 3 1
This was later revised by the provisions of the Chandler Act of 1938 with
regard to reorganization proceedings.132 Under the Bankruptcy Act, a
Chapter XIII wage-earner plan could deal with claims secured by personal property, but could not be confirmed unless every secured creditor
dealt with under the plan consented. 1 33 Chapter XIII debtors could not
modify at all the rights of a creditor holding a claim secured by real
property.134 Chapter XIII was thus of limited utility to debtors trying to
deal with secured claims. Judicial attempts to circumvent the rigid rules
35
regarding the treatment of secured claims in Chapter XIII often failed.1
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created
127. Petitioner Brief, supra note 20, at 17.
128. Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-ForLawyers Bill PartIL" Consumer Bankruptcy, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 175, 177.
129. Id
130. See infra part IV.C.3 for a general discussion of Chapter 13 cramdown provisions.
131. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. XIII, 30 Stat. 564 (as amended) (repealed 1978).
132. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
133. Chapter XIII was the predecessor to Chapter 13. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 651, 29.01, § 651, 29.02 (James W. More & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed. 1978)
[hereinafter COLLIER 14].
134. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. XIII, 30 Stat. 544-66 (as amended) (repealed
1978) (exclusion from relevant definition of "claim"); 10 COLLIER 14, supra note 133,
§ 601(1), 22.02, § 646(2), %28.03.
135. In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (citing Worley v. Budget
Credit, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 64,285 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972),
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by Congress in 1970 to review existing bankruptcy law and propose
changes, 136 recommended that debtors in a new Chapter 13 proceeding
be allowed generally greater power to deal with claims secured by personal property.
In drafting the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress significantly revised the law governing the determination of the secured status of creditors. Section 506 was intended to shift the focus from the status of
creditors as secured or unsecured, and to clarify the treatment of creditors with liens on property worth less than the amount of their claims in
bankruptcy. In the words of the Senate Committee Report discussing
section 506 of Senate Bill 2266,
[t]hroughout the bill, references to secured claims are only to
the claim determined to be secured under this subsection and
not to the full amount of the creditor's claim. This provision
abolishes the use of the terms 'secured creditor' and 'unsecured
creditor' and substitutes in their places the terms 'secured
claim' and 'unsecured claim.'137
Section 506 focused on economic reality, rather than formal legal attributes, as the determinative factor in classifying nominally secured claims.
In reforming the bankruptcy law, Congress was persuaded that both
creditors and debtors would benefit from concentrating attention on secured claims instead of secured creditors. Creditors would receive the
benefits of "adequate protection" to the full extent of their security, while
the obligations of the debtor with regard to secured creditors would be
clarified.1 3 1 Undersecured creditors would no longer be allowed to use
the ambiguity of the law to exercise unwarranted leverage over the
139
debtor and to benefit at the expense of unsecured creditors generally.
The House Report specifically rejected "a few misguided decisions"
under the Bankruptcy Act in which creditors whose debts greatly exceeded their security were permitted to assert the entire debt as a secured
claim "in preference to all unsecured creditors."'"
The rationale in Nobelman for narrowing the scope of § 506(a) was
derived from the Court's reading of the antimodification language in
and rejecting on appeal trial court's approval of plan's bifurcation of secured claim into secured and unsecured portions).
136. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
137. S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978). The version of section 506 that
appeared in Senate Bill 2266 was identical to § 506 as enacted, except for one comma. Compare H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 180-81 (1977) with 11 U.S.C. § 506.
138. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 180-81.
139. d
140. Id. at 123.
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§ 1322(b)(2), which mandates special treatment for liens secured by the
debtor's homestead. The legislative history of § 1322(b)(2) casts some
light on the nature of the special protections Congress intended to grant
From the outset of the bankruptcy reform
home mortgage lenders.'
process in the 1970s, consideration was given to treating real property
liens, including liens on the debtor's homestead, differently from other
security interests. The Bankruptcy Commission recommended that
Chapter 13 debtors be allowed to modify the rights of creditors with real
property security interests only to the extent of curing a default and continuing to make scheduled mortgage payments.14 2 The original House
version did not follow the Commission's recommendation, but proposed
instead that a Chapter 13 debtor should be allowed to "modify the rights
of holders of secured claims or of holders of unsecured claims."' 43 The
Senate version, however, preserved the Chapter XIII rule intact by
prohibiting modification of "claims wholly secured by mortgages on real
property." 1" In the final compromise version enacted in 1978, both the
Senate and House modified these versions along the lines recommended
by the Commission. According to the Joint Explanatory Statement
agreed upon by House and Senate floor managers, under Section
1322(b)(2) of the compromise version, "the plan may modify the rights
of holders of secured claims other than a claim secured by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence. It is intended that a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence may be
treated under Section 1322(b)(5)."' 45 The Senate thus retreated from its
position that no modification was to be permitted to any mortgage secured by real estate, agreeing instead to permit only cure and reinstatement, but no other modification of claims secured by the debtor's

home. 146
This limited bar on modification of secured claims in Chapter 13
was apparently in response to suggestions advanced in legislative hearings concerning the impact of the original House version on the home
141. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
142. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 13 (1973), reprintedin COLLIER 15,
supra note 123, app. 2, at I-1.
143. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1977).
144. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1977)
[hereinafter Improvements Hearings].
145. 124 CONG. REc. 34,009, 32,409 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini and Rep. Edwards, respectively).
146. Nobleman [sic], 968 F.2d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1992); see In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197,
199 (Bankr. N.D. Minn. 1990).
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mortgage lending industry. 4 7 The compromise language in § 1322(b)(2)
was enacted after a hearing at which Edward J. Kulik of Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Company expressed concern about the potential
impact of the language of the House version on the availability of home
mortgage loans. 148 However, the Senate subcommittee that heard Mr.
Kulik's testimony never reported its findings after hearing the evidence
of nearly eighty witnesses over twenty-four days, along with the testimony of another several hundred interested parties. Thus it is impossible
to determine what impact, if any, Mr. Kulik's testimony had on the final
Senate determination. 4 9 Furthermore, statements of interested witnesses are generally not accepted as authoritative legislative history for
purposes of statutory construction. 150
III.

PENDING LEGISLATION

In 1992 and 1993 Congress made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to
clarify the rights and obligations of Chapter 13 debtors and their home
mortgage lenders. Each bankruptcy reform bill introduced in the 102d
and 103d Congresses dealt with the issue of lien stripping.1 51 The proposed legislation generally reaffirmed the antimodification protection
now enjoyed by home mortgage lenders, but at the same time granted
some limited relief to debtors. The provisions that authorize a limited
form of lien stripping may be so cumbersome for debtors to actually use,
however, that any victory for debtors is more apparent than real.
Notwithstanding a bewildering array of special interests associated
with particular provisions of the proposed bankruptcy reform legislation,'" 2 several overriding reasons for promoting comprehensive bankruptcy reform motivated Congress to act. One was the urge to respond
to the soaring volume of bankruptcy filings, from only 348,488 in 1984 to
971,517 in 1992-an increase of 179%."' Virtually all the increase had
147. Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 246 (en banc).
148. Improvements Hearings,supra note 144, at 708-15.
149. Petitioner Brief, supra note 20, at 15.
150. How FEDERAL LAWS ARE MADE 26 (rev. ed. 1984).
151. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 310 (1991); H.R. 5321, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(g)
(1992); H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1992); S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 201
(1993); H.R. 2326, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(g) (1993).
152. Aaron Pressman, Can Chapter11 Be Put Back Together? Reform Movement in Senate
Could Undo Portionsof the '78 Bankruptcy Reform Act, INVESTMENT DEALERS Dia., Apr.
27, 1992, at 16.
153. The eight-year surge in bankruptcies now appears to have abated. John H. Cushman,
Jr., Bankrupt IndividualsAre Fewer, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at Cl. During 1992 the
national increase in bankruptcy filings was less than 3%, the smallest increase in the last eight
years, and well below the 20.6% increase recorded in 1990. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
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come in filings of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases.1 14 As Representative
Jack Brooks asserted, "More Americans now come into contact with the

bankruptcy court system than any other branch of our judiciary."1 5

Another reason was the desire to update the Bankruptcy Code, acting on

the lessons learned in the fourteen years following its enactment in
1978.156

The accelerating tempo and rising volume of bankruptcy litigation
and the increasing significance of bankruptcy to many areas of economic
regulation and commercial and corporate law practice are increasing the

pressure for bankruptcy reform.

57

At least some of the pressure for an

overhaul comes from groups that were never happy with the balance

struck between debtor and creditor interests when the Code was originally enacted. 1

8

Many of the basic compromises between debtor, credi-

tor, and other interests reflected in the Bankruptcy Code have come
under renewed critical scrutiny in recent years. 159 In addition to
thoughtful reconsideration of the basic premises of existing bankruptcy

law, energetic lobbying by special interest groups has produced an accumulation of proposed qualifications to the original provisions of the

Bankruptcy Code, many of which would argue obscure its basic
premises.160
Other controversial issues unrelated to lien stripping created obstacles to getting a bankruptcy reform bill through Congress. Given that
(1993) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE].
154. Chapter 11 case filings peaked in 1986, dropped considerably during 1987 and 1988,
increased by 36% from 1989 to 1991, and decreased by 5.6% during 1992. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE, supra note 153, at 1.
155. ConsumerIssues in Bankruptcy: Hearingson H.R. 5321 Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 Hearings] (statement of Rep. Brooks).
156. 138 CONG. REc. S8250 (1992) (statement of Sen. Heffin).
157. See David F. Bantleon & Kathy L. Kresch, A Bankruptcy Law for the '90s, Bus. L.
TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 25, 25. Of course, some deny that the Bankruptcy Code is in need
of substantial revisions. See, eg., Leonard M. Rosen, Book, Chapterand Worse, Bus. L. ToDAY, July-Aug. 1992, at 47, 47.
158. See, e.g., Zaretsky, supra note 125 (suggesting that Code was high-water mark for
debtors' rights and that pendulum has been swinging back in favor of creditors ever since it
was enacted).
159. These include the apparent ease with which major corporations are able to use Chapter
11 reorganization proceedings to gain an advantage over competitors; the rate of compensation
of legal, financial, and accounting professionals in major corporate reorganizations; the viability of the corporate reorganization process itself; and the ease with which individual debtors
can avoid making any significant payments to creditors while retaining a substantial number of
assets. See, e.g., Mary Graham, Bankrupt and Bullish, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1992, at 24.
160. Rob Rossi, Bar Groups Spar over Bankruptcy Code Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 17,
1992, at 6.
U. S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL INFORMATION
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the success or failure of bankruptcy reform legislation now turns on is-

sues unrelated to lien stripping, it is difficult to predict the likelihood that
Congress will act to overrule or qualify the result in Nobelman in the
near future. If comprehensive bankruptcy reform legislation is passed by
Congress and enacted into law, however, the various bills offer insights
into what such legislation is likely to provide with regard to lien
stripping.
A.

1992 Bankruptcy Reform Legislation

In November 1991 Senators Howell Heflin and Charles Grassley introduced Senate Bill 1985, a bipartisan comprehensive bankruptcy reform bill.161 When Senate Bill 1985 passed the Senate ninety-seven to
zero on June 17, it appeared possible that 1992 would bring substantial
reform in bankruptcy law. After Representative Michael Synar introduced a bill dealing with consumer bankruptcy issues"' inJune, the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law held
oversight hearings on bankruptcy issues. Representatives of the credit
industry testified to the need for bankruptcy reform legislation along the
lines of that passed by the Senate in June, and consumer advocates testified against limiting bankruptcy relief for individual debtors. 163 On October 3, the House passed House Bill 6020,14 a bipartisan bankruptcy
reform bill with narrower coverage than Senate Bill 1985. A compromise version passed the Senate on October 7. In the final negotiations to
resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of the
bankruptcy reform bill, a controversial provision providing greater protection for collective bargaining agreements and payment of insurance
benefits to retirees was added, ending the legislation's remaining chances
165
of passing before Congress adjourned.
The first version of Senate Bill 1985 introduced in November 1991
provided that a Chapter 13 plan may not "modify a claim pursuant to
section 506 of a person holding a primary security interest in real property or a manufactured home . . . that is the debtor's principal resi161. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
162. H.R. 5321, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
163. 1992 Hearings, supra note 155 (statements of Barbara L. Clore, Associated Industries
Credit Union; Willard Gourley, Jr., Mortgage Bankers Assoc. of America; Henry J.Sommer,
National Bankruptcy Conference; and Gary Klein, National Consumer Law Center).
164. H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
165. Id. § 313. These frantic last-minute attempts to forge a compromise failed on October
9, 1992, when the House adjourned and tabled the issue of comprehensive bankruptcy reform
until the new Congress convened in 1993. Bantleon & Kresch, supra note 157, at 25.
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dence. ' "' The version enacted by the Senate on June 19, 1992, had been
amended to provide that a Chapter 13 plan may not modify a primary or
a junior security interest in the debtor's home, except that a plan could
modify a junior lien to the extent that it was undersecured at the time it
attached.1 67 Senator Heflin described this provision as "one of the most
important provisions of the bill."1 6 ' He stated that this section would
protect the mortgage-backed securities market, and completely insulate
the entire claim in cases of first mortgages on the debtor's home. It was
also designed to "protect junior security interests except in circumstances
where the security interest was undersecured at the time of contracting." 169 A junior lien could only be stripped down to the extent that
it remained undersecured at the time of the bankruptcy. 70 This section
was designed both to acknowledge the courts' power to bifurcate home
at the same time
mortgages under § 1322 by the operation of § 506,1 7but
1
protect the stability of the mortgage marketplace.
The first bankruptcy reform bill introduced in the House provided
that a Chapter 13 plan may
modify the rights of the holders of secured claims, but the plan
may not modify a claim pursuant to section 506 of a person
holding a primary or a junior security interest in real property
that is the debtor's principal residence, except that the plan
may modify the claim of a person holding such a junior security
attached
interest that was undersecured at the time the interest172
to the extent that the interest remains undersecured.
The later version passed by the House Judiciary Subcommittee provided
that a plan may modify the rights of secured creditors,
except that the rights of the holder of a claim secured only by
the most senior security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence may not be modified to reduce the
secured claim to a value that is less than the value, as of the
the creditor's interest in the
date the security interest arose, of173
estate's interest in such property.
The committee report states that this section was designed to resolve the
split in the federal circuit courts created by the Nobelman case by pro166. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 310 (1991) (version 1).
167. IA (version 4).
168. 138 CONG. REc. S8252 (1992) (statement of Sen. Hefrin).

169. Id.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id
Id. at S8252-53.
H.R. 5321, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(g) (1992).
H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 202.
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tecting senior mortgage liens from bifurcation under § 506 to the extent
they were not undersecured when they were originated.' 74 The final version of Senate Bill 1985 , which passed the Senate on October 7, 1992,
provided that "notwithstanding section 506(a), the rights of the holder of
the most senior security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence may not be modified to reduce the secured claim to a
17 5
value that is less than the value of the allowed claim.'
B. 1993 Bankruptcy Reform Legislation
On March 10, 1993 Senators Heflin and Grassley introduced the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993.176 On March 31, the Senate Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice held hearings on Senate Bill 540.
Section 306 of Senate Bill 540 provides that a "plan may not modify
a claim pursuant to section 506 of a person holding a primary or a junior
security interest in" the debtor's home, except that the plan may modify
the claim of a junior lienor that was undersecured at the time it attached
to the extent that the interest remains undersecured.'" On May 27,
1993, Congressman Synar introduced a bankruptcy reform bill in the
78
House that included an identical provision governing lien stripping.
C. National Bankruptcy Conference Recommendations
While Congress attempted to pass comprehensive, bipartisan bankruptcy reform legislation on Capitol Hill, the National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC), in a program sponsored by the American Law Institute
and the American Bar Association, produced perhaps the most thorough
study of the operation of bankruptcy law since the Bankruptcy Code was
enacted in 1978.171 This report, the Bankruptcy Code Review Project
174. H.R. REP. No. 996, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1992).
175. 138 CONG. REc. S17,502 (1992).

176. S.540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Following the model of Senate Bill 1985, this bill
would create a new small business chapter, permit pension regulators to participate in corporate reorganizations, streamline the bankruptcy process, increase the eligibility ceilings for
Chapter 13, extend the life of Chapter 12, and create a national commission to study proposals
to reform further the Bankruptcy Code, as well as address the issue of lien stripping in Chapter
13. In addition, following the model of the final version of the bankruptcy reform bill that
passed the Senate on October 7, 1992, Senate Bill 540 regulates professional fees and facilitates
the collection of alimony and child support from debtors in bankruptcy.
177. Id
178. H.R. 2326, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(g) (1993).
179. BANKRUPTCY REFORM CIRA 1993: A PRESENTATION OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S BANKRUPTCY CODE REVIEW PROJECT at i (ALI-ABA Committee

on Continuing Professional Education, 1993) [hereinafter BCRP]. The National Bankruptcy
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(BCRP), covers many of the same issues addressed by the proposed
bankruptcy reform bills introduced in 1992 and 1993, although from a
One of the major conclusions of the report
more "global" perspective.'
is that while the Bankruptcy Code needs updating in many respects, it is
fundamentally sound law and is not in need of sweeping overhaul at this
time. 18 1 However, the report did address specific issues, including lien
stripping in Chapter 13.
The NBC generally recommends reaffirming the basic principles established in the Bankruptcy Code with regard to the individual debtor's
fresh start,18 2 in effect throwing down the gauntlet to the creditors' lobbies massing on Capitol Hill. With regard to lien stripping, the NBC not
only recommends that a debtor in Chapter 13 should be entitled to use
§ 506 to strip any lien, including the lien against the debtor's principal
residence, 18 3 but also recommends that Dewsnup be overruled and lien
stripping be authorized for Chapter 7 debtors as well.184 The NBC endorses lien stripping for home mortgages in Chapter 13 and in Chapter 7
because it believes that lien stripping offers creditors as much as they
would receive in a foreclosure sale while permitting the debtor to retain
the property. 8 ' In addition, the NBC argues that, based on the experience of jurisdictions that have permitted lien stripping and the experience
of lenders with mortgages on properties other than the debtor's principal
residence, the impact of broadly permitting lien stripping is unlikely to
have a significant impact on secondary mortgage markets.186
Just as it is difficult to predict whether comprehensive bankruptcy
reform legislation will pass Congress soon, it is difficult to predict how
much practical impact a scholarly study like the BCRP will have on the
legislative process. Members of the NBC recognize that without any special interest to promote their study, its impact may be slight.18 7 For example, even the American Bankruptcy Institute, the other leading
professional bankruptcy organization in the United States, supports conConference (NBC) is a voluntary, non-profit organization with about 60 members, founded in
the 1930s by bankruptcy law scholars.
180. Rossi, supra note 160, at 6.
181. BCRP, supra note 179, at ii. This conclusion is not surprising in view of the fact that
the Bankruptcy Code embodied so many of the recommendations made by the NBC during
the 1970s reform process. Aaron, supra note 128, at 21.
182. BCRP, supra note 179, at 105.
183. Id. at 157.
184. Id. at 120.
185. Id. at 157.
186. Id. at 121, 157.
187. Barbara Franklin, Bankruptcy Reform: Experts Suggest Ways to Streamline the Process, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 25, 1993, at 5.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:541

gressional proposals to convene a bankruptcy review commission rather
than to endorse the work of the NBC.'
D. Analysis
All versions of the proposed bankruptcy reform legislation have several points in common, and almost all show some variation from the
holding in Nobelman. The common elements of the draft legislation include the reaffirmation of antimodification policy for home mortgage
lenders generally, rejection of the NBC recommendation that bifurcation
be permitted for all home mortgages, and a higher degree of concern for
primary lien holders than for junior lien holders.
Some versions protect both primary and junior lien holders, but provide that a junior lien could be stripped down in bankruptcy to the extent
that it was undersecured at the time of attachment. 9 Other versions
protect only primary lien holders. 9 ' These qualified reaffirmations of
the special protection enjoyed by home mortgage lenders are designed to
preserve the special status conferred on purchase money home mortgage
lenders while meeting the criticism of consumer groups' 9 1 and the
NBC1 92 that the prohibition on stripping even undersecured or unsecured junior liens impairs the value of the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy and constitutes unfair leverage in the hands of an undeserving
class of lenders.1 9 3 This limited form of consumer protection may survive in future bankruptcy reform legislation and restrict the ruling in
Nobelman to primary, purchase money home mortgages only.
If the most recent version of the legislation 94 is intended to give
consumers somewhat more protection than they will enjoy under the
Nobelman interpretation of § 1322(b)(2), it seems unlikely to achieve
that result in practice. If debtors are allowed to avoid junior liens only to
the extent that the liens were undersecured both at the time of attachment and at the time of the bankruptcy proceeding, then the debtor must
188. The American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) was founded in 1982, has 3500 members, is
open to attorneys, accountants, and other bankruptcy practitioners and professionals, and in
some sense is a rival of the NBC. The ABI support of a national commission is arguably due
to efforts to increase its own influence as compared to the more exclusive NBC. Rossi, supra
note 160, at 6.
189. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (version 4); H.R. 5321, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992).
190. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (version 1); H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992); S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (final version).
191. Cramdown Hearing,supra note 11, at 28-34 (statement of Henry J. Sommer).
192. BCRP, supra note 179, at 122.
193. See infra part IV.A.3 for a discussion of undersecured junior liens.
194. S. 540, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
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establish the value of the collateral at two different times before qualifying for any form of lien stripping. This standard for measuring how
much of a junior mortgagee's lien will be protected in bankruptcy resembles the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code governing whether a preferential transfer exists in cases involving inventory or accounts receivable
financing. 19' In these cases, in order to prevent the trustee in bankruptcy
from avoiding a secured creditor's lien in inventory or accounts receivable, the secured creditor must establish the value of its lien ninety days
prior to filing and on the eve of filing. 196 Even if a two-step test to determine the value of a secured creditor's lien is workable in a business bankruptcy context, it is not clear that it is equally workable in a consumer
bankruptcy context.
In some cases the parties may have obtained an appraisal at the time
of attachment and may be willing to accept that as evidence of the value
of the property at the time the lien attached. If the parties are not able to
agree on the value at the time of attachment, it may be an equally difficult problem to establish the value of the property at some specific time
prior to the filing. Given the difficulty of proving the value of assets during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, 197 it is not hard to predict that determining the value of the collateral at some time prior to the
fling will be an even more complicated and subjective process.
If the burden of proof for this two-step test is placed on the debtor
rather than the creditor, then a heavy evidentiary burden will be placed
on the party with fewer resources to finance litigation. 19 8 In the terms
that Grant Gilmore used to describe the drafting of Uniform Commercial Code Article 4 by bank counsel, the proposed legislation bears the
hallmarks of a protective ordinance for cats drawn up by a committee of
195. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1988).

196. See generally I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 82, at § 6-35 on the complexity of administering this two-step test. This provision enables "floating liens" in inventory or accounts receivable to survive a preference avoidance challenge from the trustee by comparing the amount
by which a debt was undersecured 90 days prior to filing with the amount by which a debt was
undersecured at the time of filing. The trustee is permitted to avoid any reduction in the
amount of unsecured debt as a preference. The draft lien stripping provision by contrast involves the same comparison between the amount by which a debt was undersecured at the time
of attachment and filing but seems to permit avoidance of the lien only to the extent of the
lesser of the two amounts.
197. For a discussion of the shifting and elusive value of assets over the course of a bankruptcy case, see, for example, David G. Carlson, Secured Creditorsand the Eely Characterof
Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63 (1991) (noting that bankruptcy courts have
produced standards of value that are highly contextual).
198. The debtor in a Chapter 13 case must file a list of property held on the petition filing
date, a requirement that arguably places the initial burden of proof of asset valuation on the
debtor. 5 COLLIER 15, supra note 123, 1325.05[2][a].
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dogs.19 9 This problem could be resolved in part by creating a rebuttable
presumption that if a junior lien is undersecured or unsecured at the time
of filing, then it was unsecured or undersecured to the same degree at the
time of attachment, and then allowing the junior lienor to come forward
with evidence to rebut the presumption.
No matter which party bears the burden of proof under the proposed two-step test for lien stripping, the practical problems associated
with judicial determination of value in bankruptcy may substantially vitiate any debtor protection the legislation is intended to provide. The appeal of a two-step test in spite of the problems associated with its
implementation may be due to its reliance on the same "benefit of the
creditor's bargain" standard to define the rights of secured creditors that
the Supreme Court has articulated in Dewsnup and Nobelman rather
than on its practical effect.
IV.

CRAMDOWN, CREDIT AVAILABILITY, AND LIEN STRIPPING

At issue in Nobelman was the ability of debtors, notwithstanding a
creditor's objection, to strip down their mortgage liens to the current fair
market value of the creditor's home and receive a discharge for that portion of the mortgage debt thereby rendered unsecured. Lien stripping is
a variation of cramdown, or power of the debtor in bankruptcy to force a
nonconsenting creditor to accept confirmation of a plan of reorganization
so long as the plan meets certain minimum standards for the treatment of
that nonconsenting creditor.2 °" Cramdown standards embody one of the
fundamental tensions of bankruptcy law: the desire to provide an opportunity for rehabilitation for the debtor while simultaneously preserving as
much as possible of the creditor's rights as defined by state law.
Many of the arguments made in the Nobelman litigation and before
Congress with regard to proposed legislation are based on certain assumptions about the costs and benefits that lien stripping would impose
on homeowners and mortgage lenders. As is often the case in debates
over any form of debtor relief, the arguments have been characterized by
a great deal of invective, not much theory, and even less empirical evidence.20 1 In order to evaluate the plausibility of some of the claims made
199. Donald J. Rapson, Book Review, 41 Bus. LAW. 675, 677 (1986) (reviewing FRED H.
MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND NOTES

(1985)).

200. 3 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 82, at 33 n.3.
201. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 143, 146 n.19 ("[A]rguments about costs and
benefits of different forms of debtor relief remain matters of faith on all sides."); Michael H.
Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 490 (1991)
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in Nobelman, part IV describes the different cramdown standards and
surveys what empirical evidence exists concerning the costs and benefits
of those different standards.
Part IV.A reviews some of the policy issues underlying the
Nobelman case that the Supreme Court did not address, such as the tension between the federal policies of encouraging homeownership by keeping the price of mortgage finance low and granting consumer debtors a
"fresh start" through bankruptcy. Part IV.B describes the state law alternative to lien stripping in bankruptcy, usually known as antideficiency
laws. Part IV.C describes cramdown standards that apply to undersecured mortgage lenders in Chapter 12 and Chapter 11 proceedings, and
then turns to the cramdown of secured creditors other than home mortgage lenders in Chapter 13 proceedings.
A.

Policy Issues

Many of the most compelling arguments made on behalf of both the
Nobelmans and mortgage lenders were based on public policy and the
practical consequences of adopting a rule permitting lien stripping.
Mortgage lenders have fought vociferously to protect their privileged status in Chapter 13 on the grounds that it is a necessary element of the
federal government's policy to promote home ownership. The
Nobelmans and consumer advocates argued with equal vigor that lien
stripping offers a mortgage lender the equivalent of what it would receive
upon foreclosure of a mortgage lien but also preserves the full economic
benefit of a debtor's fresh start following bankruptcy. The Court did not
address the policy issues implicit in the Nobelman case, although the
outcome of the case gave lenders the result they were seeking. The case
does not offer any explicit answers to questions such as whether the federal government should be promoting home ownership when to do so
exposes homeowners like the Nobelmans to potentially devastating losses
if there is a sudden collapse in home prices. Even assuming that the
federal government chooses to encourage individuals to invest in housing, it is not clear that granting privileged status in bankruptcy to mortgage lenders at the expense of borrowers like the Nobelmans in order to
keep mortgage interest rates low is the best way to achieve that policy.
("[D]ebates over whether to repeal mortgagor protection laws have been informed by remarkably little theory and even less empirical evidence.").
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1. Credit availability
Mortgage lenders objected to lien stripping on various grounds, including (1) that it would disrupt secondary markets for mortgagebacked securities, 2 12 and (2) that it would restrict access to mortgage
credit for the most risky applicants.20 3 Lenders argued that lien stripping would force future home buyers to subsidize existing homeowners
whose mortgages were priced on the assumption that lien stripping was
not permitted: As lenders and mortgage insurance companies attempt to
recoup their losses on outstanding loans, they will be forced to increase
the prices of future loans.
In addition, lenders argued that allowing existing homeowners to
use bankruptcy proceedings to strip down their mortgages to current
market value at the bottom of the market in a recession gives those
homeowners a windfall 204 or a "head start," not just the "fresh start"
drafters of the Bankruptcy Code envisaged.20 5 In contrast, state law
foreclosure proceedings require debtors to surrender the collateral to
lenders before a debtor's personal liability, if any, can be determined.20 6
The lender then has the option to retain the asset if the lender believes
the market price will recover or to sell the asset and realize the loss. 20 7
Lien stripping in bankruptcy, however, permits the debtor both to determine the amount of the lender's loss and to retain the asset, enjoying any
subsequent appreciation if market conditions improve. Arguably, this
creates a windfall for the debtor at the lender's expense.
All these arguments have a basis in fact, but the case for protecting
mortgage lenders may not be as strong as some lenders assume. If the
rate of bankruptcy filings is a function of many variables, then the decision to permit or deny lien stripping may not appreciably change the
total number of consumer bankruptcy filings. 208 Even if lien stripping is
not permitted, homeowners can still use Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bank202. FHLMC Brief, supra note 14, at 25; MBA Brief, supra note 13, at 16.

203. FHLMC Brief, supra note 14, at 25.
204. Cramdown Hearing, supra note 11, at 45 (statement of Dean Cooper); Alaska Brief,

supra note 18, at 10-13.
205. On the issue of "head start" versus "fresh start" and "when does a pig become a hog,"
see Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).

206. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2), 9-503 (1990) (providing that secured lender is entitled to
take possession of collateral after default and to deficiency after commercially reasonable disposition of collateral unless otherwise agreed).
207. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
208. Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate:
An HistoricalAnalysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131 (1993) (increase in consumer bankruptcies
since 1978 is due more to decrease in debt servicing capacity of individuals than to change in
law).
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ruptcy proceedings to avoid personal liability for a deficiency if the mortgage debt greatly exceeds the market value of the property. Moreover,
because regulated institutional lenders do not have the option of holding
the property long enough to enjoy much, if any, rebound in values,2 ' 9
they will receive a lump sum payment when the property is liquidated
that is equivalent in value to the stream of payments a debtor would have
to offer in Chapter 13 in order to have a plan confirmed. 2 10 Additionally,
transaction costs associated with holding and liquidating the foreclosed
property would have to be offset against the lump sum proceeds of the
sale, reducing the net benefit to the lender receiving immediate repossession instead of accepting deferred payments from the current homeowner. The "windfall to debtors" issue may also be a red herring
because it is far from certain that home prices will always rebound after a
collapse in market values. Furthermore, if lenders are more certain than
homeowners or bankruptcy judges that current real property prices are
artificially low, they can invest in additional properties in order to be in a
position to enjoy future market appreciation.
2.

Home ownership

In both the Nobelman litigation and in Congress, lenders have resisted lien stripping on the ground that the resulting economic dislocation would subvert the well known federal policy of promoting home
ownership. The primary political justification advanced for the special
treatment accorded home mortgage lenders in bankruptcy was the importance of making individual home ownership as broadly available as
possible because home ownership is widely regarded as a cornerstone of
both the free market economic system and the democratic political
system.2 1 1
Since the 1930s the federal government has pursued a broad-based
policy of encouraging home ownership in the United States. The policy
has been pursued on many fronts, including tax incentives such as the
home mortgage interest deduction for taxpayers, 21 2 deposit insurance for
savings and loans and banks,21 3 mortgage insurance to holders of mort209. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1989) (national banks should not invest in real estate as
general rule with exception for properties obtained through foreclosure qualified by five-year
limit).
210. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988).
211. See infra part IV.A.2 for a discussion of the history of this policy and an analysis of its
continued viability.
212. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (1988).
213. 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
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gages that conform to federal guidelines,2 14 and other programs designed

to promote the growth of secondary mortgage markets.215
Various tax incentives encourage home ownership.216 The home
mortgage interest deduction is, in effect, a subsidy from the federal gov-

ernment to homeowners.217 In addition, homeowners may deduct property taxes from taxable income. 218 Homeowners do not have to
recognize as taxable income any imputed rent from living in the property
or any appreciation in the value of a home unless and until the home is
sold. 2 9 Even if the homeowner realizes a profit on the sale of a home,
that gain is often excluded from income if a new home is purchased
within two years of the sale. 220 For taxpayers aged fifty-five or over, up
to $125,000 of that gain may not be recognized at all.221
The federal government has also supported the flow of low-cost
funds to potential homeowners by various programs subsidizing home
mortgage lenders, although the shift in the 1980s toward financial deregulation has ended many of these programs.222 Prior to deregulation, the
segmented structure of retail financial institutions in the United States
provided the housing industry with a steady source of low-cost funds.
Interest rate regulations permitted savings and loan associations to pay
214. See supra part IV.B.1 for a discussion of federal home mortgage programs.
215. See supra part IV.B.1 for a description of secondary mortgage markets.
216. See generally Joseph A. Snoe, My Home, My Debt: Remodeling the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, 80 Ky. L.J. 431, 452 (1991) (listing several different tax incentives that
foster home ownership).
217. The deduction for interest expenses did not originally distinguish between home mortgage interest and other personal interest expenses. The interest deduction was introduced as
the federal income tax was established by the Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 63 Stat. 114,
167. The right to deduct interest generally from taxable income was preserved in the 1954
Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 163 (Supp. 11 1993). It was not until the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 disallowed the deduction for personal interest expenses that the political commitment to the home mortgage interest deduction in particular became obvious. The interest
deduction for individual taxpayers remains for the primary residence and one secondary residence, with the requirement that the interest be paid on debt incurred to acquire the residence
or for a limited number of other purposes such as education or medical expenses. See Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 51 l(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2246-58 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 163 (1988)); I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(D), 163(h)(3)(A) (1988); see also 132 CONG. REc. 26,889,
26,690 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
218. I.R.C. § 164(a)(i) (1988).
219. Id. § 1221.
220. Id. § 1034(a).
221. Id. § 121.
222. ANTHONY DowNs, THE REVOLUTION IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE 32-36 (1985). But
cf George H. Sellon, Jr., The Role of Government in Promoting Homeownership: The U.S.
Experience, 75 ECON. REv. 37 (1990) (government policies that appear to promote homeownership do no more than offset obstacles to home ownership created through regulatory obstacles impeding operation of real estate finance markets).
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interest to individual savers at rates that were below market rates but
slightly higher than those commercial banks could offer, thus channeling
household savings into institutions dedicated to investing in housing.
This indirect mechanism of encouraging savers to subsidize the borrowing costs of homeowners broke down in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
By then inflation had pushed interest rates to record highs, and the creation of money market funds had finally given individual savers alternatives to the thrift industry. Following deregulation, thrifts were forced to
offer market interest rates to savers to secure sources of funding, mortgagors were forced to pay market interest rates to purchase homes, and
thrifts were permitted to diversify out of an exclusive focus on home
mortgage lending.
Federal programs supporting home ownership that were not curtailed in the 1980s include mortgage insurance and support of secondary
mortgage markets. Mortgage insurance, provided by federal programs as
well as by private mortgage insurance companies, simplifies the mortgage
underwriting process and permits mortgage lenders to make riskier loans
than they would otherwise undertake.2 2 3 In addition, a mortgage originator in the United States has the option to hold an asset or sell it in the
highly liquid secondary mortgage market, which was created in large
part through the efforts of several federally chartered institutions. Lenders wishing to invest in home mortgages need not engage in actually underwriting the loans but may invest in a wide array of mortgage-backed
securities tailored to suit their risk tolerance and other portfolio
requirements.22 4
Just as there have been various mechanisms for implementing the
federal policy favoring home ownership, there have been many justifications offered for the policy itself. The constitutional basis for government
intervention in supporting home ownership is arguably derived from congressional authority to help provide a national system of credit that
meets the needs of the economy. 225 The impetus for the National Housing Act of 1934 was the perception that (1) a lack of activity in the housing sector was stifling further economic recovery generally, (2) the lack
of credit for mortgages and home improvements was contributing to the
low level of new construction and maintenance of existing housing, and
(3) more households desired and could reasonably afford mortgages than
were able to obtain mortgages under then-current conditions in credit
223. See infra part IV.B.1.
224. See infra part IV.B.l.
225. That in turn is based on Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Validity of Certain
Provisions of the National Housing Act, 38 Op. ATT'y GEN. 258, 269 (1935).
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markets.2 26 In the words of one commentator, "The home is the founda227
tion of our national existence and its safety is the country's safety."1
The commitment of the federal government to high-quality, affordable housing has been reiterated often. In the words of section 2 of the
Housing Act of 1949,
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its
people require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage,
through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a
suitable living environment for every American family, thus
contributing to the development and redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth and security of the Nation.2 28
The contours and degree of the federal government's commitment
to decent, affordable housing has changed in recent decades, apparently
degenerating from a real policy to a mere shibboleth invoked on appropriate occasions. 221 Financial deregulation and a burgeoning federal deficit have230reduced the flow of subsidized funds into owner-occupied
housing.
The debate over the home mortgage interest deduction re226. Ernest P. Jones, Jr., National Housing Act, 7 Miss. L.J. 270 (1935); James N.
MacLean, The NationalHousing Act Explained, 20 A.B.A. J.565 (1934).
227. J.H.C., Emergency Mortgage Legislation, 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 204, 209 (1933). According to Representative Sirovich, speaking in support of the National Housing Act,
[t]he home is the foundation of all society. Upon it the superstructure of all civilization rests. The home is the institution where the father is the king, mother the queen,
and the children are the subjects .... The home is the cradle that nurtures our
offspring. The home is the institution that shapes the destiny of our brood. As go
the parents, so go the children; as go the children, so goes the home; as goes the
home, so goes the Nation and the world. Destroy the home, and you destroy society,
civilization, and everything that goes with it.
Everyone is praying for happiness, for comfort, and prosperity to return to all
who struggle for their daily bread in order that their home may be maintained. We
are hoping for a new day to break in upon all of us. Today the mortgages upon the
homes of millions of our people are being foreclosed. Hunger, penury, want, and
destitution stare these millions in the face. Today the homes of these unfortunate
people are being threatened as never before. Economic conditions threaten to
achieve what fire, flood, wind and invasion have never done before.... And what is
the cause of it all? It is the lack of money with which to preserve the home, rebuild
the home, and build new homes.
78 CONG. REc. 11,182 (1934) (statement of Rep. Sirovich).
228. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413, quoted in Futureof FHA: HearingsBefore
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406
(1977).
229. See supra notes 7-9.
230. DowNs, supra note 222, at 14, 294.
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vealed that it is now acknowledged to be little more than a selective subsidy to the middle class rather than a broad-based policy supporting
affordable housing.23 The tremendous success of government-sponsored
initiatives in secondary mortgage markets has made it possible for the
government to withdraw partially, permitting privatized agencies or private issuers to continue to expand participation in those markets.2 32
Even if the federal government remains committed to promoting
private home ownership, it is unclear that encouraging mortgage lenders
to offer mortgages at lower cost by prohibiting lien stripping in Chapter
13 is the best way to do this. Lenders perceive mortgagor protections as
expensive and inefficient obstacles that needlessly increase interest rates
to nondefaulting borrowers. Professor Schill has argued that state law
mortgagor protections can be reconceptualized as creating an insurance
system for consumers by adopting an ex ante perspective.2 33 Treating
the right to strip home mortgage liens in bankruptcy as a similar form of
insurance system would indicate that permitting lien stripping might increase the overall efficiency of home mortgage markets, rather than
merely add unnecessarily to the interest rates paid by nondefaulting
borrowers.
3.

Junior liens

In Nobelman, the Supreme Court did not directly confront the issue
of junior liens: As Texas has the most restrictive law of any United
States jurisdiction governing junior liens on homesteads, the facts did not
squarely present the issue. In Texas a debtor's homestead is exempt from
seizure through creditor process unless a creditor's lien is (1) a purchase
money lien, (2) a property tax lien, or (3) a materialman's lien for improvements to the property.2 34 Therefore, home equity loans and other
forms of junior mortgages, very popular in many jurisdictions, are not
permitted in Texas. Permitting stripping of junior liens but protecting
purchase money liens would have little impact on mortgage lending in
Texas, 235 but would have a large impact on consumer lending outside
Texas.
In proposed bankruptcy legislation introduced in 1992 and 1993,
legislators repeatedly evidenced a willingness to distinguish between
231. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. 26,690 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
232. WILLIAM B. BRUEGGEMAN ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE 648-53 (8th ed. 1989).

233. Schill, supra note 201, at 500.
234. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West 1993).
235. Stripdown of junior homestead liens is not impossible, however, even in Texas. For
example, a swimming pool contractor might have a valid junior lien that becomes unsecured

following a general decline in home prices.
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purchase money home mortgage lenders and junior lienors.2 36 This distinction is reflected in the preferential status accorded purchase money
financing in the Uniform Commercial Code 237 as well as elsewhere in the
Bankruptcy Code. 238 Given that the antimodification provision of
§ 1322(b)(2) is an exception to the general rule that all secured creditors
are subject to cramdown in rehabilitative bankruptcy proceedings, the
tendency has been to construe the exception to cover only a narrow category of lenders and deny special treatment to credit providers who happen to take a security interest in the debtor's homestead rather than
enabling the debtor to acquire the homestead itself. The proposed legislation therefore treats junior liens on the debtor's homestead as subject to
the general rule permitting lien stripping rather than as qualifying for the
special, narrow exception reserved for a privileged category of lenders.
In addition, several other policy justifications support denying antimodification protection to junior lienors. One has to do with predatory
lending practices prevalent in communities that have traditionally been
denied access to finance on conventional terms. Although the practice of
granting home equity loans to permit homeowners to cash out their equity in houses that may have appreciated substantially since purchase
may not raise significant policy issues in many instances, a real problem
arises when low-income households-in which home equity may be the
only significant asset-are pressured into granting multiple liens on their
homesteads by unscrupulous lenders.2 39 Predatory lenders may target
members of minority communities threatened with foreclosure by refinancing their debt at astronomical interest rates. 2" The ability of such
junior lienors to hide behind the antimodification provision of
§ 1322(b)(2) is particularly offensive to public policy.
236. See supra part III.A.
237. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), 9-312(4) (1990) (creating ten-day period for perfection of purchase
money security interest); id § 9-302(1)(d) (automatic perfection of purchase money security
interest in consumer goods).
238. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) (1988) (exception to automatic stay to perfected purchase-money
security interests); id § 547(c)(3) (late perfection of purchase-money security interest not preferential transfer).
239. See, eg., Amicus Curiae Brief of Harold J. Barldey, Jr. in Support of Petitioner at 9,
Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (No. 92-641) (predatory lending practices not uncommon among
consumer debtors and such lenders should not be given special protection under Bankruptcy
Code); JULIA P. FORRESTER, MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CRITICAL LOOK AT

(forthcoming).
240. In the words of a Federal Reserve Bank president in recent congressional testimony,
Second mortgage abuses represent one of the most emotional issues facing Congress,
regulators, lenders and the public. Some homeowners, usually the elderly or disadvantaged, have been literally "conned" out of their homes through abusive secondmortgage practices. Others who have not lost their homes have been so burdened by
high payments that their lives have been severely disrupted.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PROMOTION OF HOME EQUITY FINANCING
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The problem of taking junior liens as part of abusive credit practices
is similar to the problem Congress faced when drafting the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978 with regard to nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security
interests in household goods. Section 522(t) prohibits this form of security interest in order to safeguard the economic reality of a debtor's fresh
start and to remove incentives for creditors to engage in overreaching
credit practices. Although all secured lending can be understood as an
attempt by the lender to gain leverage over the borrower,2 4 1 a particular
problem arises when the lender's leverage becomes so great that it exceeds the bounds of reasonable commercial practices. Congress enacted
§ 522(f) because of concern that consumers would impair the value of
their fresh starts by reaffirming debts secured by household items with
little or no resale value but of great value to their owner.242 To the extent
that junior liens on the debtor's homestead have no economic value, the
same concern applies to them.
B.

State Law Antideficiency Regimes

Antideficiency statutes balance the competing principles of rehabilitation for debtors and preservation of creditors' rights under state law in
a manner that roughly corresponds with the operation of cramdown
standards under federal bankruptcy law. Antideficiency statutes provide
some degree of relief from personal liability for mortgagors following
foreclosure of their interest in the property when the proceeds of the sale
of the property do not fully retire the outstanding mortgage debt. Antideficiency statutes parallel cramdown under bankruptcy in that they
may permit a debtor to shift the cost of depreciation in the value of the
mortgaged property to the lender. They differ from cramdown in that
they protect a debtor only following repossession and foreclosure of the
collateral by the lender.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Nobelman, it was unclear
how much a debtor had to pay in order to confirm a plan stripping down
a mortgage lien. This made it more difficult to determine whether the
federal bankruptcy system was more generous to debtors retaining their
homes in bankruptcy than state law regimes. The most extreme reading
The FederalReserve President's Views on Monetary Policy and Economic Conditions: Hearings
Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1993)
(statement of Richard F. Syron, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).
241. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv.
901, 926-27 (1986).
242. The Bankruptcy Reform Act Hearings on S.235 and S.236 Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 98 (1975).
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of Nobelman would require that a debtor in bankruptcy wishing to retain
his or her home may not confirm a Chapter 13 plan without offering to
pay in full the debt of all mortgagees, including those whose security
consists of unsecured junior liens on the debtor's home even though those
liens were undersecured at the time they attached. 243 Such an interpretation of federal bankruptcy law grants junior lienors more leverage over a

debtor than exists under state law regimes that provide some form of
antideficiency protection for homeowners. On the other hand, the interpretation of § 1322(b)(2) adopted in the Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth

Circuits accorded a debtor considerably more leverage under federal
bankruptcy law in dealing with a mortgage lender than even the most
generous state law regimes. 2 "

Notwithstanding the emergence over the last twenty years of real
estate credit markets integrated into national and international capital

markets, state law regimes regarding the rights and obligations of mortgagors and mortgagees vary tremendously. 245 The impact of this diver-

sity in legal regimes on the efficient operation of the now highly
developed national market for mortgage obligations is unclear.2 46 With
regard to estimating the costs of lien stripping under federal bankruptcy
law, however, it might provide a valuable source of data for evaluating

the probable impact of lien stripping on mortgage markets.
243. Nobelman is silent on this issue; thus, it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court
has really adopted such an extreme position. Prior to the resolution of the split in the circuits
by Nobelman, several lower courts rejecting bifurcation and lien stripping under § 1322(b)(2)
held that debtors had to pay undersecured junior Hens in full. See, e.g., Landmark Fin. Servs.
v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (4th Cir. 1990); Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 718
F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1983); Vines v. Mid-State Homes (In re Vines), 153 B.R. 345, 347
(Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1993); In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992); Etchin v. Star
Servs., Inc. (In re Etchin), 128 B.R. 662, 682 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991); Boullion v. Sapp (In re
Boullon), 123 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 202
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
244. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.
1992); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom., 980 F.2d 1279 (9th
Cir. 1992).
245. See DowNs, supra note 222; Schill, supra note 201, at 489; Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: ResidentialReal Estate FinanceLaw in the 1990s and the Implicationsof
ChangingFinancialMarkets, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261 (1991).
246. Schill, supra note 245, at 1300 (benefits of increased efficiency in secondary mortgage
markets from federal preemption of local real estate law are unclear). But see Jo Anne Bradner, The Secondary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real Estate Financing, 36 EMORY L.J. 971 (1987) (regional variation in local real estate law creates market inefficiencies that
market forces might correct over time but federal preemption is preferable because it would be
more effective).
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While there are certain similarities between lien stripping and antideficiency laws, it is not possible to draw direct parallels between the
two systems. A generous antideficiency regime in some sense simply mirrors bankruptcy relief, whether or not lien stripping is allowed, because
the homeowner can avoid personal liability for the mortgage debt under
both systems. While personal liability for a deficiency is at issue under
state law, permitting or forbidding lien stripping in bankruptcy primarily
affects the parties' transaction costs. If lien stripping is permitted, the
homeowner will pay the lender the equivalent of what would have been
realized through a foreclosure sale, thus saving the homeowner from incurring relocation costs and the lender from incurring the warehousing
and administrative costs of conducting a foreclosure sale. If lien stripping is not permitted, a debtor committed to retaining possession of his
or her home may pay more than the current market value for the home,
impairing the fresh start, or may surrender the property to the mortgagee
and shoulder the costs of relocating. In addition, a bankrupt homeowner
will be excluded from buying any other home for some time as a consequence of filing for bankruptcy. While some lenders may be in a position
to hold a surrendered property to see if market values recover, regulated
institutional lenders must liquidate foreclosed properties reasonably
promptly, and are thus unlikely to enjoy much appreciation prior to
sale. 247
From the few empirical studies that have been done comparing the
impact of different state law foreclosure regimes on the pricing or availability of mortgage credit, it remains unclear how much impact a nationwide policy of permitting lien stripping based on federal law would have
on access to and the terms of mortgage credit.24 While the economic
literature on the issue does not provide ready answers, there does not
seem to be much support for the repeated assertions of mortgage lenders
that instituting a more generous lien stripping regime through the Bankruptcy Code will have calamitous effects on the availability of mortgage
credit, although it may indeed have a measurable impact.2 49
247. See 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1989).

248. There are no empirical studies directly on the issue of the impact of antideficiency laws
or lien stripping in isolation from other risks associated with default by the borrower on the
price of credit. See infra text accompanying notes 278-86 (reviewing economic literature).
249. See Cramdown Hearing,supra note 11, at 50-51, 66, 82, 85, 92 (prepared statements of
John P. Davey, Larry Gilmore, Michael S. Polk, Robert E. McKew, Suzanne Hutchinson, and
Frank M. Salinger); Realtors' Brief, supra note 12, at 14; MBA Brief, supra note 13, at 16;
FHLMC Brief, supra note 14, at 25-26; Nationsbanc Brief, supra note 13, at 19-20. But cf
Cramdown Hearing,supra note 11, at 29 (statement of Henry J. Sommer); CEPA Brief, supra
note 11, at 58-61.
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1. Structure of mortgage markets
In order to assess the impact of antideficiency laws and lien stripping on the pricing and availability of mortgages to would-be homeowners, it is helpful to first outline briefly the principal features of mortgage
markets in the United States before setting forth the basic mechanisms of
default and foreclosure of mortgages under state law. The pricing of
mortgage obligations occurs in what are known as primary and secondary markets.25 0 While it was once the case that mortgage obligations
were held in the investment portfolios of the institutions that originated
them, mortgages are now packaged and sold in large numbers on the
secondary mortgage market in the form of mortgage-backed securities."5 1
The pricing of mortgage obligations in primary markets is a function
of the loan underwriting process. In underwriting a loan, a lender obtains an appraisal of the property and evaluates the creditworthiness of
the borrower.25 2 In assessing the borrower's ability to repay the loan, the
lender will compare the borrower's income and net worth to the amount
of the proposed mortgage payment, and will also consider the amount of
the borrower's down payment.25 3
A major factor minimizing the risk of loss to the lender upon default
by the borrower is mortgage insurance. Mortgage insurance may be provided by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or private mortgage insurance companies (PMIs). The FHA, unlike PMIs, insures the
entire amount of the loan.25 4 The Veterans Administration (VA) also
offers qualified veterans a home loan guarantee program, which is similar
to mortgage insurance. 2 5 Federal guidelines for real estate lending policies suggest that residential mortgages should not be made in excess of a
250. This summary is based on 10 SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET GUIDE §§ 3-4
(Charles L. Edson ed., 1992).
251. BRUEGGEMAN ET AL., supra note 232, at 7.
252. Id. at 178.
253. Some traditional rules of thumb in mortgage underwriting include that total mortgage
payments (principal and interest) should not exceed 25% of the borrower's total income, and
total mortgage payments plus other housing expenses such as taxes, insurance, utilities, and
that maintenance should not exceed 33% of the borrower's total income. Lenders usually
require a down payment of between five and twenty-five percent of the purchase price. Frank
J. Fabozzi & Dexter Senft, Introduction to Mortgages, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGEBACKED SECURrrIEs 14 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 3d ed. 1992).
254. The National Housing Act of 1934 established the FHA which is currently a part of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1708-1710 (1993); see also
BRUEGGEMAN ET AL., supra note 232, at 181-82.
255. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3703, 3710 (1991). The Veterans Administration also has authority to make direct loans under 38 U.S.C. § 1811 (currently 38 U.S.C. § 3711), but rarely does
so. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw 755 n.5 (2d ed.
1985).
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ninety percent loan-to-value ratio without mortgage insurance or readily
marketable collateral.2 6 This creates an equity cushion that protects the
lender against declines in property values.
Mortgage insurance programs have different eligibility criteria,25 7
different methods of calculating and collecting premiums,2 5 and different procedures following default by the borrower.25 9 For example, FHA
insurance is available for houses, condominiums, cooperatives, apartment buildings, and many other types of real property, but VA and PMI
insurance is usually provided only for houses and condominiums. 2" Premiums may be collected at closing as a lump sum that the borrower may
finance together with the purchase price of the property, or in monthly
installments for the life of the mortgage.2 6 1 In order to make a claim
against the FHA under one of its single-family programs, a lender must
acquire title to the property, either by foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure, and transfer the property to the FHA.2 62 The FHA then pays
the lender the full loan balance and any expenses incurred by the lender
in connection with the default.2 63 The FHA generally sells the property
after acquiring it and subrogates to the lender's rights, if any, to seek a
deficiency judgment from the borrower. 216 Because VA and PMI programs do not insure the entire amount of the mortgage, upon default
they generally pay lenders less than the full loan balance, and may or
may not take title to the property.2 6 From the point of view of a lender
that accepted mortgage insurance in lieu of a larger down payment, the
difference between foreclosure under state law and lien stripping under
bankruptcy law is very significant because the FHA and VA have refused
to compensate insured lenders following Chapter 13 cramdowns.2 66
256. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.32(d)(2) (1992) (Office of Thrift Supervision loan-to-value ratio
for federal savings associations).
257. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 255, at 754-64.

258. Id. at 760.
259. Id. at 761-64.

260. Id. at 755-56.
261. Id at 760.
262. Id. at 761.
263. 24 C.F.R. § 203.402 (1992).
264. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 255, at 762. The FHA has become more aggressive
in recent years about pursuing borrowers liable for any deficiency. See 53 Fed. Reg. 4384-85
(Feb. 16, 1988).
265. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 255, at 762-63.
266. Cramdown Hearing,supra note 11, at 26; see also VA Office of General Counsel Precedent 1-91, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,156 (1991); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., Letter No.
91-27 (June 4, 1991).
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The secondary mortgage market consists of the buying, selling, and
267
trading of existing mortgage loans and of participations in such loans.
A secondary mortgage market of some description has always existed in
the United States, 268 but since the 1930s the phenomenal growth in that
market has been supported by various federal government programs.
These programs include the standardization of mortgage contract terms
and the provision of mortgage insurance, which supported the expansion
of secondary market activity by reducing the risk of default and by standardizing the assets to be pooled. The original mortgage insurance program established by the FHA in the 1930s permitted the risk of default
by individual borrowers to be spread across a large population of borrowers through the payment of small premiums virtually eliminated the risk
of loss to the lender.26 9 The original FHA insurance program also created incentives for the standardization of mortgage contract terms by
conditioning eligibility to participate in the program on the use of standard contracts promulgated by the FHA, although the FHA now permits lenders to use their own forms if they meet FHA criteria.2 70
The growth of the secondary mortgage market has also been fueled
by the operations of several federally chartered corporations established
to engage in secondary market activities. These include the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae), 2 7 the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae), 2 and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie
Mac). 273 Additional congressional support for the secondary mortgage
267. GNMA MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. DEALERS ASS'N, THE GINNIE MAE MANUAL 98

(1978).
268. Prior to the mid-1950s, the secondary market consisted of life insurance companies
buying mortgages originated by mortgage bankers and eastern thrifts buying mortgages
originated by thrifts in other regions. BRUEGGEMAN ET AL., supra note 232, at 647.
269. Id. at 113.
270. 53 Fed. Reg. 34,279 (1988); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 255, at 755 n.4.
271. FNMA's original charter was contained in Title III of the National Housing Act, 48

Stat. 1246 (1938). FNMA was first wholly government owned and administered, but in 1954 it
was partially privatized. Under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750 (1989)), FNMA's original functions were divided between the new Government National Mortgage Association and a reconstituted FNMA, which became a wholly private organization. See NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 255, at 765.
272. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1717(a)(2)(A) (1989) created the Government National Mortgage Association as a government agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
273. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 461 (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-3, 1715z-8, 1717, 1719, 1720, 1726, 1730, 1749 (1989)). Title III of the
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
to facilitate the interregional flow of mortgage money between different areas of the United
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market has been provided with the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984,274 and in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.275
Among the most important government programs facilitating the
growth of the secondary mortgage market since the 1950s are the payment guarantee programs of GNMA. The first of these programs

originated in 1968 when GNMA was authorized to guarantee the timely
payment of principal and interest on securities backed or secured by
pools of mortgages insured by the FHA or guaranteed by the VA.2 76 A
payment guarantee from a quasi-governmental organization effectively

freed secondary market investors from concern over the risk of default
on the individual mortgage obligations backing their securities. Many
private and public institutional lenders now issue their own mortgage-

backed securities guaranteed by the issuing institution or by a PMI.27 7
Various elements are taken into account in the pricing of mortgages

in secondary markets. These include risk of default by the borrower, 278
risk of default by the guarantor,27 9 interest rate risk,28 ° prepayment

risk,281 and liquidity risk.282 The risk of default by the borrower is thus
only one of many factors taken into account by an investor in making the
decision to invest in a mortgage-backed security. Evaluating risk of de-

fault by the borrower or guarantor is facilitated in secondary markets by
States, and to facilitate the flow of financial resources into mortgage markets from other forms
of capital investment. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 255, at 764-66.
274. Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689. The Act granted an exemption to the restrictions
on credit extension by securities dealers for a "mortgage related security."
275. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
276. BRUEGGEMAN ET AL., supra note 232, at 651.
277. NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 255, at 772.
278. Risk of loss due to default by the borrower is a function of the lender's ability to collect
not only from the borrower but also from the mortgage insurer if one exists. FHA provides
the most comprehensive coverage; VA and PMI programs provide less. See BRUEGGEMAN ET
AL., supra note 232, at 672.
279. GNMA is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government while
FNMA and FHLMC have only indirect government guarantees. See id.
280. For example, if market interest rates rise, the market price of fixed-interest-rate, mortgage-backed securities will fall more than variable interest rate mortgage-backed securities.
See id.
281. Greater than anticipated loan repayments will result in a lower than anticipated yield
for a mortgage pool. Since 1983 a new form of bond known as "collateralized mortgage obligations" or CMOs has been developed and has grown in popularity as investors attempt to
manage prepayment risks associated with mortgage-backed securities. CMOs are bonds collateralized by mortgage-backed securities. CMOs are divided into "tranches," which are scheduled to receive different cash flows from the underlying mortgage-backed securities, such as
principal payments or interest payments. See e.g., Gregory J. Parseghian, Introduction to
CollateralizedMortgage Obligations, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGi BACKED SECURITIES, supra note 253, at 287.
282. Fabozzi & Senft, supra note 253, at 25.
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the existence of credit rating agencies."83 Market risks such as interest
rate risk, prepayment risk, and liquidity risk, however, are not included
in credit rating analyses.
2.

Foreclosure regimes

The standard modem American version of the foreclosure process is
as follows: Following a default by the borrower, and after appropriate
notice and opportunity for the borrower to proffer the outstanding balance to the lender, the lender may proceed to a public sale of the subject
real estate.28 4 The sale may be a judicial sale conducted under court supervision or may be conducted by an agent of the mortgagee under a
power of sale granted in the deed of trust.2 81 The purchaser at this sale
generally takes title to the property free of any liens junior to the foreclosed lien and free of the borrower's interest. The price realized at the
foreclosure sale is applied to the borrower's indebtedness. Any surplus
over the debt is paid to any junior lienors party to the foreclosure action;
the remaining funds, if any, are then paid to the borrower. Any deficiency between the sale price and the debt may become a personal liability of the borrower.
While in theory the mechanics of foreclosure following default are
straightforward, in practice the process is subject to many formalities and
requirements based on local law and practice. 28 6 A significant risk from
the borrower's perspective is that the foreclosure sale conducted by the
lender will realize an unreasonably low price, creating a large deficiency
that constitutes a personal liability of the borrower. Without further regulation, this ability of the lender to impose the costs of an unfair or defective foreclosure sale on the borrower might remove much of the incentive
the lender has to maximize the price realized at the foreclosure sale. Ab283. For a description of the procedures and standards applied by a credit rating agency,
see, for example, STANDARD & POOR'S CORP., S&P's STRUCTURED FINANCE CRITERIA
(1988). In addition to risk of default by borrower or guarantor, credit rating agencies also
evaluate the legal structure of the mortgage-backed-security transaction and the cash flow
structure of the transaction. Id. at 80-81.
284. Only two states permit "strict foreclosure," which permits the lender to retain title to
the property in satisfaction of the debt. Schill, supra note 201, at 492 n.6. (citing CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 49-15 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4528 (1973)). Public foreclosure sales were
substituted for strict foreclosure in an effort to produce the best possible price for the borrower
or junior lienors. See Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosureby Sale as De
Facto Strict Foreclosure-AnEmpiricalStudy of Mortgage Foreclosureand Subsequent Resale,
70 CORNELL L. Rv. 850, 852 (1985).
285. Schill, supra note 201, at 493.
286. "These requirements include, for example, commencing an action to foreclose on the
property, posting and publishing the notices, and holding the public sale." Wechsler, supra
note 284, at 851 n.2.
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sent any form of mortgagor protection, a lender might buy the property
itself at the foreclosure sale for an artificially low price, realize a profit on
the resale of the property, and still have the right to pursue the borrower
for the deficiency set by the purchase price at the sale. Most states have

therefore enacted some form of mortgagor protection designed to prevent
the more egregious forms of mortgagee manipulation of the foreclosure

process.
One important form of mortgagor protection is protection from unlimited personal liability for any deficiency produced by the foreclosure
sale.2 8 7 While many states288 have some form of protection for borrowers against gross defects in the conduct of foreclosure sales, the degree of

protection and the mechanism for providing that protection vary tremendously from state to state. Some of the most minimal forms of protection

include a "single action" requirement-that is, that no deficiency can be
recovered unless it is sought in the same proceeding as the foreclosure
sale itself 2 8 9 -or that a deficiency be recovered within a specified period
of time such as three months or two years. 290 A more significant form of
protection uses some value other than the price received at the foreclo-

sure sale as the benchmark to determine the amount of the deficiency,
thus insulating the debtor from liability arising out of a defective or
287. Schill, supra note 201, at 495. Another common form of mortgagor protection is a
statutory right of redemption that permits the borrower to redeem the property after the foreclosure sale from the purchaser at the sale. Postforeclosure right of redemption will not be
discussed in this Article.
288. Based on the Author's own informal survey, 11 states-Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming-appear to have no form of mortgagor protection that could be described
as an antideficiency law, whereas six states appear to have a limited form of antideficiency
protection based on an interpretation of case law precedent: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 35-10-6
(1991); Colorado, Smith v. Juhan, 311 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1962), United Bank, N.A. v.
One Center Joint Venture, 773 P.2d 637, 639 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Hawaii, Wodehouse v.
Hawaiian Trust Co., 32 Haw. 835, 852 (1933), International Trust Co. v. Suzui, 31 Haw. 34,
41-42 (1929); Maryland, Hersh v. Allnutt, 250 A.2d 629, 632 (Md. Ct. App. 1969); Mississippi, OMP v. Security Pac. Business Fin., 716 F. Supp. 251, 258 (N.D. Miss. 1989); and
Pennsylvania, Robison v. Sumner Brick & Tile Co., 11 Pa. Super. 48, 53 (1899).
289. States with a form of this rule include: California, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West
1993); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-716 (1990); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 6-101
(Supp. 1993); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 654.5-.6 (West Supp. 1993); Montana, MONT. CODE
ANN. § 71-1-222 (1991); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.430 (Michie Supp. 1991); New
York, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 1301(3), 1371(3) (McKinney 1979); Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (West 1988); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (1990); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 846.04 (West 1977).
290. See, ag., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 17A (West 1988) (two years); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 76-1013 (1986) (three months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-2.1 (West 1987) (three
months); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (90 days).
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fraudulently conducted foreclosure sale.29 1 The benchmark value might
be fair market value as determined by a judge2 92 or a jury,29 3 an appraised value, 294 or a judicially determined upset price. 29' Finally, some

jurisdictions excuse the borrower from any personal liability for the deficiency. Some of these states focus on the situation where the risk of selfinterested behavior by lenders is greatest and protect borrowers only if
the sale is a nonjudicial sale conducted by the lender or a trustee under a
deed of trust.2 9 6 Some states excuse borrowers from liability for any deficiency on purchase money mortgages.29 7 Arizona alone protects borrow291. Twenty-four states provide this protection in some form, including: Arkansas, ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-50-112 (Michie Supp. 1991); California, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726; Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-28 (West Supp. 1993); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 702.06 (West Supp. 1993); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161(a) (Harrison 1990); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE § 6-108 (Supp. 1990); Louisiana, LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 2336-37
(west 1961); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6324 (west Supp. 1992); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1013; Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.457 (Michie 1986); New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-3 (west 1987); New York, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 1371 (McKinney 1979); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1992); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-19-06 (Supp. 1993); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.20 (Anderson 1991);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 386 (west 1988); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8103(a) (1982); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-660 to 760 (Law. Co-op.
1977); Texas, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (West Supp. 1993); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 57-1-32 (1990); Vermont, VT. R. Civ. P. § 80.1(j) (1988); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 61.12.060 (West 1990); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 846.165 (West 1977).
Some states, such as Maryland and Minnesota, provide that even though the deficiency is
measured by the difference between the debt and the foreclosure sale price, the debtor may
avoid liability for the deficiency if he or she can prove that the foreclosure sale was unfair or
defective. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-105 (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582 (west
Supp. 1993).
292. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726; GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161(a); IDAHO CODE § 6-108
(1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1013; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 386; 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8103(a); VT. R. Civ. P. § 80.1 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060.
293. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06.
294. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-28; LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. arts. 2336-37; NEV.
REV. STAT. § 40.457; S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-680.
295. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329 (Anderson 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1-17-316 (West
1977).
296. ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (1990); CAL. CIV. CODE § 580(d) (West Supp. 1992);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 580.23(1), 582.30(2) (west 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-07 (Supp.
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 43 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 61.24.010,
61.24.040 (west 1990).
297. ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729(A) (1990); CAL. CIV. CODE § 580(b) (West Supp.
1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.06 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 654.26 (West Supp.
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2342 (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-232 (1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-07; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 88.070-.075
(1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 44-8-20-24 (1983); UTAH JUDICIAL CODE § 78-37-1
(1992).
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ers from any deficiency arising out of a decline in the market value of the
29 8
real estate not attributable to factors within the borrower's control.
Given the large variations among states regarding lenders' rights to
pursue borrowers for personal liability for any deficiency produced by a
foreclosure sale, it would not be surprising to find that this diversity in
creditors' rights produces significant variations in the pricing of mortgage credit between states. Such a finding could be used to buttress the
claims of mortgage lenders that making lien stripping generally available
would restrict access to credit and disrupt mortgage markets. While
credit rating agencies take information regarding state law creditors'
rights into account when analyzing the probable frequency and severity
of default of mortgage-backed securities in secondary markets, and while
economic analysis supports the general proposition that state law entitlements have some impact on mortgage interest rates, the precise nature of
the relationship is far from clear. Interest rates reflect not only the risk
of loss following default, but also such factors as the risk of loss associated with fluctuating market interest rates and the possibility of prepayment by the borrower. Very little systematic research has been done to
determine what impact differences in state foreclosure laws have had on
losses incurred by lenders or mortgage insurers, and whether mortgage
interest rates and terms accurately reflect the economic consequences of
those differences. 29 9
Although the relationship between state law foreclosure regimes and
the price and terms for which mortgage credit is made available has not
been quantified, certain aspects of the relationship between the costs of
default by the borrower and the pricing of mortgages by lenders have
been established. An early study found that regional differences in mortgage interest rates were due largely to regional variations in supply and
demand for mortgage capital rather than variations in the institutional
structure of mortgage markets." °° A later study found that low foreclosure costs may not indicate lower default risk but may instead reflect
losses incurred in informal negotiations. 0 1 Another study found that
298. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729(A).
299. Schill, supra note 201, at 490 n.3; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 143, 146
n.19; Terrence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect of State ForeclosureLaws on Loan
Losses: Evidence from the Mortgage InsuranceIndustry, 22 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
234 (1990) (noting that mortgage insurance companies have historically charged uniform premiums that do not reflect variations in costs associated with state foreclosure laws, and that
this may change).
300. A.H. Schaaf, Regional Differences in Mortgage FinancingCosts, 21 J. FIN. 85 (1966).
301. Terrence M. Clauretie, The Impact of InterstateForeclosure Cost Differences and the
Value of Mortgages on Default Rates, 15 J. AM. REAL EST. & URBAN ECON. ASS'N 152
(1987).
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mortgage interest rates have both a regional and a national component:
Differences in loan-to-value ratios, state usury laws, and state foreclosure
laws accounted for much of the regional variations in mortgage rates, but
interregional differences in interest rates appeared generally to decline
with the growth of the secondary mortgage market in the 1970s. The
study found that cumbersome foreclosure procedures resulted in higher
interest rates. 302 A more recent study of losses incurred by private mortgage insurers similarly found that antideficiency laws and a right of redemption increased the cost of mortgage finance.30 3
The validity of studies finding that mortgagor protection laws significantly increased interest rates were called into question by a later study
showing that they had seriously overstated the impact of those protections on mortgage pricing. 3°4 A recent study of mortgage pricing and its
to default risks found that where loan-to-value ratios were
relationship
low 30 and house prices stable, the contribution of default risk to price
could be ignored without serious consequences, but that where loan-tovalue ratios and price volatility were high, risk of default had a significant impact on interest rates.30 6 The economic literature thus suggests
that there are significant relationships between incentives created by the
legal environment and the behavior of both lenders and borrowers, but
the importance of different state law foreclosure regimes in determining
interest rates remains unclear. The lack of any empirical studies demonstrating that generous antideficiency regimes--considered in isolation
from other factors contributing to default risks--drive up the cost of
mortgage credit, or that mortgage rates or terms have changed in regions
where lien stripping has been permitted, however, undermines the credibility of the more extreme claims of lenders.30 7
302. Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home MortgageRates, 34 J. EcoN. &
Bus. 143 (1982).
303. Terrence M. Clauretie, State ForeclosureLaws, Risk Shifting, and the PrivateMortgage
InsuranceIndustry, 56 J. RISK & INS. 544, 551 (1989).
304. Schill, supra note 201, at 514.
305. The loan-to-value ratio is the amount of the loan divided by the value of the property.
Loan-to-value ratios are low where lenders have an ample equity cushion and high where the
amount loaned approaches or exceeds the value of the property.
306. James B. Kau et al., A Generalized Valuation Model for Fixed-RateResidential Mortgages, 24 J. MONEY, CREDrr & BANKING 279 (1992).
307. Schill found that the economic literature overstated the costs of mortgagor protection,
but that it was still difficult to evaluate the impact of mortgagor protection laws on economic
efficiency because the benefits from such laws were difficult to quantify. Schill, supra note 201,
at 501, 515.
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C. Treatment of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy
In order to estimate whether the costs of permitting lien stripping

for home mortgages in Chapter 13 exceed the benefits, the Chapter 13
cramdown standard for home mortgages can also be compared with

cramdown of mortgage lenders under other bankruptcy chapters, and
with Chapter 13 cramdown of other types of secured creditors. As with
antideficiency laws, published empirical studies of the impact of bank-

ruptcy law on economic activity provide only incomplete and indirect
evidence of the costs and benefits of such cramdown standards. Any in-

ferences drawn with regard to the likely impact of stripping down home
mortgages based on these studies must likewise be tentative. Yet as with

antideficiency laws, such evidence as is available does not support the
most dire predictions of mortgage lenders in the Nobelman litigation and
before Congress.30 8

In all three major reorganization chapters of the Bankruptcy Code,
the following considerations apply to any attempt by a debtor to

cramdown a secured lender. Section 506(a) determines the extent to
which an "allowed" claim is a "secured" claim. 3 9 The bankruptcy court
can only confirm a plan that, inter alia, provides to the nonconsenting
secured lender the "value" of its "allowed secured claim. 3 10 Value in
this context means "present value," or that if the amount is not paid in

cash upon confirmation it must be paid with interest over the life of the
plan. 31 1 The Bankruptcy Code gives little concrete guidance as to the

precise mechanics of valuation, 312 leaving the courts to resolve questions
of value on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis.313 Courts have adopted

several different standards, including fair market value,31 4 replacement
value to the debtor,3 15 going concern value,316 or forced sale or liquida308. See supra notes 7-9.
309. For a discussion of § 506(a), see supra part II.
310. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4) (1988).
311. 2 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 82, at 639.
312. Section 506(a) provides in part: "Such value shall be determined in light of the purposes of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of the property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest."
I1 U.S.C. § 506(a). Bankruptcy Rule 3012 provides: "The court may determine the value of a
claim secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest on motion of any party
in interest and after a hearing on notice to the holder of the secured claim and any other entity
as the court may direct." FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012.
313. See 3 COLLIER 15, supra note 123, 1 506.04.
314. See, eg., Lopez v. Beneficial Mut. Say. Bank (In re Lopez), 75 B.R. 961 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987), aff'd, 82 B.R. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
315. See, e.g., In re Courtright, 57 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986).
316. See, eg., In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, 77 B.R. 991 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1987),
rev'd, Ill B.R. 752 (1990).
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tion value.3 17 Likewise, there is little consensus with regard to what in-

terest rate must be used to calculate present value.318
The outer limits of congressional authority to permit a debtor to
modify a secured creditor's rights in any bankruptcy proceeding are set
by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.3 1 9 The fine line between an

unconstitutional impairment of a creditor's property right and a constitutional exercise by Congress of the bankruptcy power emerges from a line
of cases interpreting the Frazier-Lemke Act, a Depression-era, debtorrelief statute that authorized a form of lien stripping. In 1934 Congress
passed the Frazier-Lemke Act,3 20 which provided that a farmer unable to

reach a voluntary restructuring of his or her debt with creditors could be
adjudicated a bankrupt and then, under court supervision, retain posses-

sion of the property for five years if the debtor paid a reasonable rental
value and complied with any court orders. 321 A farmer could also
purchase the property outright at any time before the end of the five
years by tendering to the court an amount equal to the appraised value of
the property. 322 Prior to the Frazier-Lemke Act, bankruptcy proceed-

ings did not generally affect secured creditors at all. 323 The new provi317. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 54 (1978); 2 COLLIER 15, supra note 123, 361.02.
318. Possible rates include the creditor's cost of funds, the market rate for a similarly situated borrower, a markup over the Treasury Bill rate, the contract rate, the Internal Revenue
Service rate for delinquent tax payments, or the legal rate. See 2 Eps'rEIN ET AL., supra note
82, at 640-45; see also 5 COLLIER 15, supra note 123, %1129.03[4][fj[i] (stating creditor's claim
is in effect coerced loan so interest should be at market rate).
319. "The bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking
private property without compensation." United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,
74 (1982) (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)). At issue
is the relationship between the Bankruptcy Clause, which grants Congress the power to "establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States," U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the Fifth Amendment, which states that "no person shall.., be
deprived of... property, without due process of law... nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation," U.S. CONST. amend. V. But see James S. Rogers, The
Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983) (arguing Bankruptcy Clause itself, not Fifth Amendment, limits congressional bankruptcy power
with regard to rights of secured creditors).
320. Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 203(s)
(1988)). The Frazier-Lemke Act amended the Bankruptcy Act by adding subsection 75(s).
IdL
321. Pub. L. No. 73-486, § 75(s)(7), 48 Stat. 1289, 1291 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 203(s) (1934)).
322. Id.
323. John C. Anderson & Rex D. Rainach, FarmerReorganizations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 28 Loy. L. REv. 439, 447 (1982).
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sions for the first time granted debtors the ability to shift the costs of
falling farm values onto secured lenders.
The Supreme Court struck down the Frazier-Lemke Act as an unconstitutional impairment of the mortgagee's property rights.3 24 In response Congress passed minor amendments to the provisions of the
Frazier-Lemke Act,32 which in its revised form was upheld by the
Supreme Court.32 6 Although the correct interpretation of the Supreme
Court opinions dealing with the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the bankruptcy power is far from clear,32 7 it is generally assumed that a secured creditor is only entitled to have the value of its
secured position protected in a rehabilitative bankruptcy proceeding.32 8
Subject to these general principles, however, the treatment of secured
creditors in reorganizations under Chapters 12, 11, and 13 vary considerably in the particulars.
1. Chapter 12: Adjustment of debts; family farmer
In response to a perceived economic crisis in the American farming
community and to the apparent inadequacy of existing Bankruptcy Code
provisions for dealing with the reorganization of family farm indebtedness, 329 Congress enacted Chapter 12 as part of the Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986.330
324. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
325. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat. 942. The most notable change was
the shortening of the period for the stay of foreclosure proceedings and debtor's right of redemption from five to three years. See 2 COLLIER 15, supra note 123, 362.01.
326. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). The
Frazier-Lemke Act remained in effect only until March 1, 1949 when it expired. See Act of
April 21, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-495, 62 Stat. 198.
327. Although the most plausible interpretation is that Vinton and other subsequent cases
such as Wright v. Union Central Insurance Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940), overrule Radford, most
commentators and courts assume that later cases merely refine the teachings of Radford. See
Rogers, supra note 319, at 981.
328. 2 COLLIER 15, supra note 123, 362.01.
329. See Farm Bankruptcy: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac.andProc., and
Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Farm
Hearings1]; Farm Bankruptcy Amendments: Hearingson H.R. 1397 and H.R. 1399 Before the
Subcomm on Monopolies and Comm. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Farm Hearings2]; America's Farm Crisis: Who's to Blame, Government or Farmer?: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Crisis in the Rural Economy and its Effect on Small Businesses:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Export Opportunitiesand SpecialSmall Business Problems of
the Comm. on Small Business, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Farm Hearings4]; The
Economic Evolution of Rural America: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agric. and Transp.
of the Joint Econ. Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
330. Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1231 (1986)).
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The cramdown standards of Chapter 12, and the costs they have imposed
on farm credit, are highly relevant to the question of whether a similar
form of cramdown should be permitted homeowners in Chapter 13 for
the following reasons: A deliberate decision was made by Congress to
provide a generous form of debtor relief with the provisions of Chapter
12; the decision to provide a liberal cramdown standard to family farmers is a recent one, taken in the face of policy arguments by farm lenders
very similar to those made by mortgage lenders regarding Chapter 13
lien stripping; and there have been some attempts to quantify the economic impact of the permissive cramdown standards in Chapter 12.
Chapter 12 has been controversial since its inception and remains
so. 33 1 The provisions of Chapter 12 were due to expire on October 1,
1993.332 In 1992 and 1993 Congress received testimony on whether to

extend the expiration date to 1995. 333 Provisions extending the life of
Chapter 12 have been included in all versions of proposed bankruptcy
reform legislation introduced in 1992 and 1993.) 3 Legislation to extend
Chapter 12 until at least October 1995 was passed by Congress, and
signed into law by President Clinton on August 6, 1993.111
Following a long period of rapidly rising prices for agricultural land,
low interest rates, and steady, high prices for agricultural produce, a
large number of farmers who had taken on substantial debt during the
1970s were caught in the 1980s by a sudden downturn in land values,
rising interest rates, and falling prices for their output.3 36 Prior to the
creation of Chapter 12, family farmers in default on their obligations had
the following options: (1) attempting an informal workout with creditors; (2) surrendering their farms to creditors and liquidating their farm
operations under Chapter 7; (3) attempting to reorganize under Chapter
13 although its debt ceilings were generally too low to help most family
331. See Patrick B. Bauer, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: A Response to
Professor White's Sortie Against Chapter12, 13 J. CORP. L. 33 (1987); James J. White, Taking
From Farm Lenders andFarm Debtor Chapter12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 J. CORP. L. 1,
2-4 (1987).
332. Pub. L. 99-554, § 302(0, 100 Stat. 3124 (1986).
333. Extension of the Family FarmerBankruptcy Act: Hearing on H.R. 5322 Before the
Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Farm Hearings].
334. The Senate bill passed in June 1992 would have extended Chapter 12 from 1993 to
1995. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 401 (1992). Legislation introduced in 1993 would extend
Chapter 12 to 1998. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1993, sec. 1, § 302(0, 107 Stat. 311, 311 (1993).
335. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1993 § 1.
336. Steven Shapiro, An Analysis of the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 15
HoFsrRA L. REV. 353, 360-61 (1987).
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farmers;337 or (4) attempting to reorganize under Chapter 11. For a significant number of farmers, none of these alternatives was adequate to
prevent foreclosure of their farms by lenders.338 In Congress legislators
were willing to rally to the populist cause of the embattled family
farmer33 9 and pass temporary legislation designed to stave off disaster
until the causes of the crisis, perceived to be beyond the control of individual farmers, abated. 340 Agricultural lenders objected to Chapter 12
vociferously on the grounds that relatively few farmers had taken on unmanageable levels of debt, most farmers and lenders were able to achieve
informal workouts, and granting debt relief to that proffigate few would
effectively impose a tax on the prudent majority.34 1
Most provisions of Chapter 12 were modeled after corresponding
provisions of Chapter 13 for individual debtors rather than the more
cumbersome Chapter 11 for business reorganizations. 342 Farmers in
Chapter 12, as a result, did not have to contend with certain onerous
requirements of Chapter 11, such as the "absolute priority" rule as3 it4
343 the disclosure and voting requirements,
applies to unsecured claims,

337. The debt ceilings for debtors under Chapter 13 are $350,000 for secured debts and
$100,000 for unsecured debts. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
338. See, eg., 132 CONG. Rlc. S15,076 (1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
We must stop the bleeding on the farm. Mr. President, I harbor no illusions about
the ability of the Federal Bankruptcy Code to redress farmers' grievances. I know as
well as anyone that the economic causes of the crisis in agriculture lie well beyond
the realm of bankruptcy. But hearings in the House and Senate led to the unmistakable conclusion that the Bankruptcy Code doesn't work for farmers.

Id
339. White, supra note 331, at 2-4.
340. Although there is a consensus among economists that farmers face economic challenges of a unique nature, there is no consensus as to what precisely constitutes the "farm
problem." See generally Bruce L. Gardner, Changing Economic Perspectives on the Farm
Problem, 30 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 62 (1992) (stating that economists variously describe
"farm problem" as function of low farm incomes despite rising productivity and instability in
supply due to technological factors, low farm prices, or volatile prices).
341. FarmHearings 1, supra note 329, at 124-39 (statement of Oliver Hansen, representing
Independent Bankers Association); Farm Hearings 2, supra note 329, at 23-24 (testimony of
James Eatherly, on behalf of American Bankers Association).
342. Whether Chapter 12 should be more closely modeled after Chapter 11, recognizing the
business nature of family farming, or after Chapter 13, giving farmers the advantages of simplified procedures and greater leverage over secured creditors, was debated at the time the legislation was enacted. See Farm Hearings 2, supra note 329, at 56-59 (statements of Professor
Frank Kennedy and Gary Jewel, Midland Bankers Trust, Memphis, Tennessee); Farm Hearings 4, supra note 329, at 289 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
343. The "absolute priority" rule requires that a plan provide that any nonconsenting class
of unsecured claims be paid in full or that the plan pay nothing to any junior classes of claims
and interests (such as equity interests). See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8), (b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988). In the
farm reorganization context, this meant that the farmer could not keep the farm unless unsecured creditors consented or were paid in full.
344. 11 U.S.C. § 1125.
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the adequate protection standards imposed in Chapter 11, 34 s and the
special protection of undersecured mortgage lenders provided by
§ 1111(b)(2). 34 6 As with Chapter 13, Chapter 12 protects creditors' interests by providing for a standing trustee and by requiring the debtor to
fie a plan promptly.34 7
The benefits conferred on debtors by Chapter 12, however, exceeded
those of Chapter 13 with regard to lien stripping.348 Farmers in Chapter
12 were granted the right to strip down the mortgage on the debtor's
principal residence, which for a farmer might also be the principal place
of business.3 4 9 In addition, under Chapter 12, a court could confirm a
farmer's plan even if it included long-term debts not fully repaid within
the plan period.35 0 Thus, a farmer could strip down an undersecured
mortgage to the current value of the real property, pay the balance due
on the mortgage over a period exceeding the term of the plan, receive a
discharge on the undersecured portion of the debt, and retain possession
of the property. After Nobelman, Chapter 13 does not permit this for
home mortgages. Additionally, even an undersecured claim outside the
protection of the antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2) cannot be
stripped down unless the debtor proposes to pay off the current value of
the collateral under the plan. 3 1 Although a Chapter 12 plan may provide for repayment of the mortgage beyond the term of the plan, the
court still cannot grant the debtor a discharge of the unpaid balance due
on the modified mortgage debt when the debtor has completed payments
under the plan.3 52 If the farmer defaults on the modified obligation, a
creditor could take steps to foreclose the modified mortgage in state
court.

35 3

345. 11 U.S.C. § 1205 (providing for market rent, not interest cost; Timbers later obviated
this issue even in Chapter 11).
346. For a discussion of 11 U.S.C. § 1111, see infra notes 367-400.

347. 11 U.S.C. § 1221.
348. A major distinction between Chapters 12 and 13 was the increased debt ceilings that
determined eligibility for Chapter 12; however, eligibility for Chapter 12 is not relevant to the
discussion of cramdown standards.
349. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b)(2), (b)(9), 1228(a)(1) (1988) with 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1322(b)(2), 1328(a)(1) (1988).
350. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(9).
351. This is due to the confirmation standard in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) requiring
payment of the present value of the collateral under the plan.
352. See 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(1). This is equivalent to the Chapter 13 discharge standard in
§ 1328(a)(1), which provides that the court cannot grant a discharge of indebtedness for which
the last payment is due after the plan is completed.
353. See Farm Hearings2, supra note 329, at 131 (statement of Professor Kennedy).
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Creditors and some legislators objected strenuously to the lien stripping provisions of Chapter 12. 31 4 The fears of legislators and lenders
concerning lien stripping in Chapter 12 mirror concerns regarding lien
stripping in Chapter 13. Since the enactment of Chapter 12 in 1986,
there have been at least two attempts to quantify the impact of the liberal
cramdown standards on farm credit35 5 as well as further congressional
hearings on the desirability of delaying the expiration of Chapter 12.356
One serious obstacle to quantifying the impact of Chapter 12 on the
availability and terms of farm credit, however, is the fact that the additional leverage it grants to debtors has been used by some family farmers
to negotiate informal debt restructurings, eliminating the need for a for35 7
mal bankruptcy filing.
In 1989 the Government Accounting Office (GAO) studied statistics
and case information on Chapter 12 activity and conducted surveys of
participant attitudes on various issues, including credit availability and
the cost of credit to farmers.3 58 With regard to the availability and terms
of farm credit, the GAO study relied exclusively on an attitudinal survey
of a small number of creditors and did not attempt any independent verification of the information as reported. A majority of creditors reported
that they were less willing to lend to farmers who had filed for Chapter
12, and that they had raised interest rates charged to all farm borrowers
as a result of Chapter 12, or had lowered individual loan amounts or
354. Farm Hearings2, supra note 329, at 40 (statement of James Fatherly, First National

Bank, Tonkawa, Oklahoma); id. at 116, 188 (statement of Thomas J. Stanton); 132 CONG.
REC. 28,592 (1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). In the words of Senator DeConcini,

The provision of this bill that troubles me the most is the provision that will permit a
family farmer to go into bankruptcy, write down the secured debt to the current
value of the land, and then begin to pay the creditor based on what amounts to a new
mortgage based on the value of the farm. The thought that a person cannot pay their
debt and yet may retain their property and only continue payments based on the
value of the property as of the filing of the bankruptcy is entirely new-and dangerous. Why won't every farmer with a substantially undercollateralized loan against
his farm declare bankruptcy?... I fear that we have created a legal atmosphere that
may well encourage farm bankruptcies and that farmers who can now manage to

work things out with their creditors in some satisfactory manner to both will no
longer have that incentive to reach mutual agreement .... This bill... has precluded
a creditor from any hope of participating in an upswing in the value of its collateral.
132 CONG. REc. 28,609-10 (1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
355. ROBERT N. COLLENDER, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., BANKRUPTCY COSTS UNDER CHAPTER 12 (Staff Rep. No. AGES 9210) (1992); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FARM FINANCE: PARTICIPANTS' VIEWS ON ISSUES SURROUNDING CHAPTER 12 BANKRUPTCY (1989)
[hereinafter GAO STUDY].

356. 1992 Farm Hearings,supra note 333, at 1-2.
357. GAO STUDY, supra note 355, at 11; see also 1992 Farm Hearings,supra note 333, at 4
(testimony of Bankruptcy Judge A. Thomas Small).

358. The GAO interviewed 59 participants, including six judges, five trustees, 11 debtor
attorneys, eight creditor attorneys, and 29 creditors. GAO STUDY, supra note 355, at 4-5.
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raised collateral requirements.3 5 9 However, the reliability of such selfreporting by lenders should be open to question, as evidenced by the admission of one banker in the congressional hearings in 1992 that his bank
had actually increased its agricultural lending since 1986.16 In those
same hearings, one bankruptcy judge testified that he had seen little evidence of farmers taking advantage of the more generous cramdown provisions of Chapter 12.361 Other observers have also noted that the initial
reaction of some lenders to reduce their exposure to farmers following
enactment of Chapter 12 was modified when their worst fears were not
362
realized.
The Collender Study treats the family farmer as a form of business
enterprise equivalent to a corporation and relates the data on economic
costs created by Chapter 12 to corporate finance theories of agent-principal incentives and estimates of the costs of business bankruptcy. Collender distinguishes direct bankruptcy costs (such as legal and
administrative costs) and indirect costs (resulting from economic distortions associated with bankruptcy or the threat of bankruptcy that cause
inefficient resource allocations). 36 3 He found that the direct costs of
Chapter 12 bankruptcies seem to be relatively low-as little as three percent of asset value-which is consistent with the legislative objective of
simplifying bankruptcy proceedings for family farmers.3 4 With regard
to indirect costs, however, he found that they ranged from 90% to 100%
of asset value for cases in his sample; these were much higher than the
estimates of indirect costs for business bankruptcy filings under Chapter
11.365 This was interpreted to mean that the more liberal provisions of
Chapter 12, including the cramdown standard, were causing more debtors to file for bankruptcy, even when no economic benefit was produced,
than was the case under Chapter 11. Collender estimated this larger
number of unproductive filings would cause farmers to pay 0.25% to 1%
more for credit than they would in the absence of Chapter 12.366
359. Id at 14-20.
360. 1992 Farm Hearings,supra note 333, at 47-48 (statement of Phil Bums, President and
CEO, Farmers & Merchants National Bank, West Point, Nebraska).
361. Id at 21 (statement of Bankruptcy Judge A. Thomas Small). Judge Small was one of
the principal drafters of Chapter 12.
362. Andrea Bennett, Chapter 12 Changes Ways Lenders Serve Farmers, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 16, 1988, at 26.
363. COLLENDER, supra note 355, at 1.
364. Id at 6.
365. Id at 12-13.
366. Id at 15.
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2.

Chapter 11: Reorganization

Cramdown standards in Chapter 11 are relevant in evaluating the
impact of cramdown standards in Chapter 13 not only because Chapters
11 and 13 are both procedures aimed at rehabilitating a distressed debtor,
but also because many individual debtors are now forced to file under
Chapter 11 by the eligibility limits for Chapter 13.367 Chapter 11 is generally thought of as governing business reorganizations whereas Chapter
13 governs individuals. However, there is no requirement that a Chapter
11 debtor be engaged in business,3 6 and many unincorporated businesses
are handled through Chapter 13 when the owner of the business files.36 9
Many homeowners no longer qualify for Chapter 13 because the value of
their homes, even after allowing for declining market values, exceeds the
Chapter 13 ceiling of $350,000 on secured debts.3 7 ° Debtors in jurisdictions with house prices well above the national average, such as Southern
California, still have the option of stripping down their home mortgages
because Chapter 11 does not contain the same antimodification provision
at issue in Nobelman, although creditors have the option to make a
§ 111 l(b)(2) election3 71 to try to protect their interests in a Chapter 11
proceeding.
Chapter 11, like Chapter 13, is based in large part on the reorganization provisions of the Chandler Act of 1938.372 The Chandler Act introduced four forms of reorganization: Chapter X for publicly held
companies, Chapter XI for closely held companies, Chapter XII for real
estate owned by partnerships or individuals, and Chapter XIII wageearner plans for individuals. 37 3 Chapter 11 is an amalgam of (1) Chapter
X, modeled on nineteenth-century equity receivership, which provided a
mechanism for cramming down creditors, including secured creditors,
but also included the absolute priority rule designed to protect unsecured
creditors from overreaching by management and shareholders; (2) Chapter XI, modeled on common-law composition, which required the consent of all interested parties to confirm a plan and which could not affect
367. Lisa H. Fenning, The Future of Chapter 11: One View from the Bench, 1993-1994
ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L. 113, 125 (stating that consumers are forced to file Chapter 11 in high-

priced housing markets, such as Los Angeles, to save homes because of debt ceilings in Chapter 13).

368. Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2202 (1991).
369. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1988) (providing for special duties of trustee if Chapter
13 debtor is engaged in business).
370. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
l(b)(2)
371. See supra text accompanying notes 346-62 for a discussion of 11 U.S.C. § 111
elections.
372. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 878.
373. COLLIER 15, supra note 123, app., at 1.
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the rights of secured creditors without their consent; 374 and (3) Chapter
XII, which permitted the cramdown of secured creditors but provided
none of the elaborate safeguards of Chapter X, such as the absolute priority rule.37 5
The basic protection granted creditors in a Chapter 11 proceeding is
that a court will not confirm a plan of reorganization unless the creditors
have either voluntarily accepted the plan, or the creditor's rights were
not impaired under the plan.3 76 This protection is not absolute, however,
because the Bankruptcy Code also grants debtors, subject to certain limitations, broad powers to modify the rights of creditors without their consent.37 7 If an impaired class of creditors does not accept the plan, the

court cannot confirm the plan unless it meets the cramdown standard
contained in § 1129(b). While the operation of Chapter 11 cramdown is
very complex with regard to secured creditors, generally a plan must provide that the secured creditor both retains the collateral and is paid in
full over the life of the plan, that the collateral will be sold and the claim
paid in full from the proceeds, or that the debtor retain possession of the
38
collateral, but provide the creditor with the equivalent of its property.
With regard to undersecured creditors in particular, § 1111 (b)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code contains an important qualification to the power of
debtors to cramdown nonconsenting creditors.3 79 Under § 111 1(b)(2) se-

cured creditors may elect special treatment designed to prevent Chapter
11 debtors from stripping down an undersecured claim to the current
value of the collateral, thus denying secured creditors the ability to participate in any future appreciation in the value of the collateral. In essence § 1111(b)(2) provides that nonrecourse loans are treated as
374. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS
ON BANKRUPTCY 959 (2d ed. 1990).

H. JACKSON,

CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS

375. John C. Anderson & Eric S. Ziegler, Real PropertyArrangements Under the Old and
New Bankruptcy Acts, 25 Loy. L. REv. 713, 714-15 (1979).

376. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1988).
377. These limitations include, for example, the requirements that creditors receive at least
as much under a plan of reorganization as they would in a liquidating Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
that at least one class of creditors whose rights have been modified accept the plan voluntarily,
and that the debtor make full and fair disclosure of the details of the plan before creditors are
required to vote on it. The absolute priority rule, designed to protect unsecured creditors from
manipulation of the reorganization system by junior interests such as shareholders, is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a summary of the cramdown process in general, see 3 EPSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 82, at §§ 10-15 to -22; Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know
About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
378. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (1988).
379. Section 111 l(b)(2) provides in part: "[N]otwithstanding section 506(a) of this title, [an
electing undersecured creditor's] claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed." 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1988).
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recourse loans in determining the amount of a secured creditor's claim in
Chapter 11, and that an undersecured creditor may prevent the bifurcation of its claim into secured and unsecured portions by electing to have
the entire claim deemed a secured claim. If the § 111 l(b)(2) election provisions worked as Congress intended, many of the criticisms of home
mortgage lenders could be answered by introducing corresponding provisions into Chapter 13. This solution to the problems associated with lien
stripping is probably not feasible, however, because the standard terms of
home mortgage loans differ so greatly from those of commercial real
property loans. Furthermore, it is unclear whether § 1llll(b)(2) affords
even Chapter 11 undersecured creditors the protections it was intended
to provide.
Section 1111(b) was enacted in response to a bankruptcy case,380 In
re Pine Gate Associates, Ltd. ,38Mdecided under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act. In Pine Gate, the bankruptcy court allowed investors in a
real estate limited partnership to pay only the appraised value of the
property in order to purchase the property from the undersecured nonrecourse lenders. The lenders had accepted nonrecourse notes from the
partnership, agreeing to look only to the collateral for satisfaction of the
382
debt and waiving the right to pursue the investors for any deficiency.
From the secured creditors' perspective, they had waived the right
to a deficiency in exchange for the right to foreclose on the property after
default, giving the lender the option to hold the property and wait for
any subsequent recovery in the value of the collateral. Nevertheless,
lenders were dismayed when the bankruptcy court in Pine Gate held that
the investors were protected from any personal liability for the deficiency-because the original loan to the partnership had been nonrecourse-but deprived the secured creditors of their right to participate in
any future recovery in the value of the property. 8 3 Notwithstanding the
380. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978); see 124 CONG. REc. H32,406-08
(Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CoNG. REc. S17,420 (Sept. 7, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
381. In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976).
382. Nonrecourse lending is common in commercial real estate because the right to collect
a deficiency may be prohibited by contract or state law. For example, limited partnership
structure effectively creates a nonrecourse loan for the borrower because of limited liability for
the limited partners. James A. Pusateri et al, Section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: How
Much Does the DebtorHave to Pay and When Should the CreditorElect?, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J.
129, 131 (1984).
383. The court relied on § 461(1 1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 761(11)(c)) (repealed 1978). Section 461(11)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act provided that a plan
of arrangement shall provide any nonconsenting class "adequate protection for the realization
by them of the value of their debts" by "appraisal and payment in cash of the value of such
debts."
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common perception among commercial real estate lenders that the Pine
Gate case was harsh in its treatment of secured creditors, 3 84 the court did

attempt to balance the debtor's and the lenders' interests by requiring the
debtor to pay cash for the property. 38 5 Thus, while lenders may have
been deprived of the opportunity to participate in any recovery of the

particular apartment complex at issue in Pine Gate, the court ensured
they had cash to reinvest in a similar property if they were convinced
that real property prices were artificially low and wanted to be positioned
to take advantage of any future upswing in prices.

Real estate lenders were sufficiently shocked by the outcome in Pine
Gate to lobby Congress for a provision in the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 to overrule the case.386 The provisions of the § I lll(b)(2) election reflect lenders' concerns with the facts of Pine Gate. First,
§ 111 l(b)(1)(A) provides that, for the purposes of making a § 111 1(b)(2)
election, nonrecourse debt shall be treated as recourse debt. In addition,
under § l l(b)(2), an undersecured creditor may waive its unsecured
3 87
claim in exchange for having its entire allowed claim deemed secured.

The creditor making a § 111
l(b)(2) election is then entitled to demand
that total payments under the plan equal the total amount of the deemed
secured claim, in addition to being entitled to a stream of payments with
a present value equal to the value of the collateral.3

8

To give a simplified example, consider the case of a creditor with a
nonrecourse debt of $100 and collateral worth $60. The creditor can
foreclose on the property outside of bankruptcy. If the creditor forgoes

the option to hold the property following foreclosure, it is limited in its
recovery to the proceeds of any foreclosure sale. In Chapter 11, in the
384. See, eg., In re Mesa Business Park Partnership, 127 B.R. 144, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1991).
385. Pine Gate, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 1484. In a subsequent valuation hearing, the court
held that the property had to be appraised at the higher going concern value, not the lower
forced sale, and added a premium of 20% onto the appraised value to allow for the possibility
of future appreciation. In re Pine Gate, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 301, 315-16 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1977).
386. A senior vice president of the real estate division of a life insurance company stated
during congressional testimony, "Mr. Chairman, I would have to speak for the life insurance
industry. [If the existing law is not reformed,] I think we would channel more of our funds
into direct placements and bond purchases and stay away from mortgages, particularly where
limited partnerships are the borrowers." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Improvements in the JudicialMachinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 715 (1977) (testimony of Edward J. Kulik, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.).
387. Although the language of § 111 l(b)(2) is unclear, the election is available to both recourse and nonrecourse undersecured lenders. See Klee, supra note 377, at 161.
388. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1988).
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absence of a § Ill 1(b)(2) election, the creditor holds a secured claim of
$60 and an unsecured claim of $40. In the event of cramdown under
§ 1129(b), with regard to the secured claim, this creditor would be entitled to a stream of payments with a present value of $60, but with regard
to the unsecured claim, might receive very little.3 89 If the undersecured
creditor made a § 111 l(b)(2) election, that creditor waives the unsecured
claim of $40-and the right to vote on confirmation of the plan together
with the other unsecured claim holders-in return for the right to a
deemed secured claim of $100. The creditor is now entitled to a stream
of payments under the plan totalling $100; however, the present value of
those claims still must equal only the value of collateral, $60.
The § 111l(b)(2) election has been criticized as ineffective or misguided on several grounds." ° It has been called misguided because it is
based on the flawed premise that the Pine Gate case presented a special
problem requiring a unique resolution. 9 1 This premise is flawed if Pine
Gate merely represented a problem of judicial valuation of economic resources, a problem of the timing of the appraisal, or a problem of
prodebtor bias among bankruptcy judges.3 92 If the risk of undervaluation of real property collateral when debtors seek to cash out undersecured creditors is really one of these problems, then the attempt to
provide a special remedy for nonrecourse undersecured mortgage lenders
undermines other, arguably more important, bankruptcy policies such as
equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.3 93
A major reason that a § 111l(b)(2) election may be ineffective in
protecting undersecured creditors is that, no matter what the dollar
amount of the payments an undersecured creditor is entitled to demand,
the present value of what the debtor must offer is still limited to the value
of the collateral. Therefore, the right to demand that the unsecured portion of a creditor's claim be paid in full may have little economic value if
the stream of payments is made over the long term and the rate of interest used to calculate present value is relatively low. To continue with the
above example, if the debtor proposes a five-year plan and uses a ten
389. A class of unsecured claims may receive less than payment in full provided that any
junior claims or interests (such as equity interests) received nothing. This is one possible outcome under the application of the "fair and equitable" standard of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) for
the secured claim and § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) for the unsecured. See 3 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note
82, at §§ 10-15 to 10-20.
390. Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditorin Reorganizationsand the Nature of
Security, 38 VAND. L. REv. 931, 943 (1985).
391. Id.
392. Id. at 943-50.
393. Id. at 967.
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percent interest rate to calculate present values, a creditor not making a
§ ll11(b)(2) election with a debt of $100 and collateral worth $60 will
only be entitled to annual payments of $15.83 a year. If that creditor
makes a § I11 1(b)(2) election, then that creditor is entitled to payments
totalling $100 over the five-year plan with a present value of $60. Assuming the plan provides for equal annual installments of $20 over the
life of the plan and a discount rate of ten percent, then the present value
of the payments is $75.82. The creditor will only be receiving $15.82
more in the present value of the stream of payments for having made the
§ 111 l(b)(2) election. If the debtor is able to confirm a plan that pays out
the secured creditor over ten years instead of five, the real economic benefit of the § 111 1(b)(2) election is even less. In the absence of the election, the creditor is entitled to annual payments of $9.76 on a secured
claim of $60 with a discount rate of ten percent. Assuming the plan
provides for equal annual installments of $10 over the life of the plan and
a discount rate of ten percent, then the present value of the payments is
$61.45, an increase of only $1.45 in the present value of the stream of
payments for having made the § 111 l(b)(2) election.
Assuming, however, that the § 111 1(b)(2) election has been successful in providing some additional protection to nonconsenting, undersecured creditors in Chapter 11 and that nonconsenting home mortgage
lenders have at least as much equitable claim to special treatment as nonrecourse commercial real estate lenders, should lien stripping be permitted in Chapter 13 if combined with a provision modeled after
§ 1111 (b)(2)? The answer would seem to be "no" because the different
structures of standard commercial real estate mortgages and standard
home mortgages would make any provision similar to § 111 l(b)(2) unworkable in Chapter 13. If Chapter 13 debtors were permitted to strip
down undersecured home mortgages and pay off the deemed secured
claim over a term of years exceeding the three-to-five-year maximum for
a Chapter 13 plan, 394 then a § 1111(b)(2)-style election would produce
little or no real economic benefit to the mortgage lender. If Chapter 13
debtors were required to pay off the deemed secured claim within the
term of the Chapter 13 plan, few Chapter 13 debtors would be able to
generate the cash flow to pay off the deficiency within the term of the
plan to take advantage of the lien stripping option.395
394. That is, in the same manner as farmers are allowed to strip down undersecured mortgages on their family farms. See supra part IV.B for a discussion of Chapter 12 lien stripping.
395. See, eg., Zeigler v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Zeigler), 1992 WL 50006 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 1992); Taras v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Taras), 136 B.R. 941
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).
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The standard home mortgage is a self-amortizing, 396 long-term loan,
often with a maturity of fifteen, twenty, twenty-five, or thirty years. By
contrast, a commercial real estate mortgage is usually of much shorter
duration-often as little as three to five years, and may be self-amortizing
or may be a "bullet" or "balloon" loan with little or no principal repaid
during the term of the loan.397 If a lien stripping provision were introduced into Chapter 13 following Nobelman, it would have little impact
on debtors facing substantial declines in the appraised values of their
homes unless debtors were given the same option to repay the modified
mortgage over a period in excess of the three-to-five-year term of the plan
that farmers enjoy under Chapter 12. From the lender's perspective,
however, a § 111l(b)(2)-style election would produce little economic
benefit if the homeowner were permitted to pay off a substantial deficiency over a period of twenty or more years because the present value of
payments made ten years or more in the future rapidly decreases to nominal levels. For example, assuming a discount rate of ten percent, a dollar to be paid in twenty years has a present value of about fifteen cents
today. On the other hand, forcing the debtor to repay the deficiency
within the three-to-five-year term of the plan, while guaranteeing that the
lender receives something of value from making a § 111 l(b)(2)-style election, would put lien stripping beyond the means of many homeowners
with undersecured mortgages. Thus, even assuming the effectiveness of a
§ 111 1(b)(2)-style election in Chapter 11, the different economic characteristics of commercial and home mortgage lending make the provision
unworkable in Chapter 13.398
While in recent years there has been a virtual flood of publications
attempting to quantify the costs and benefits of the Chapter 11 corporate
reorganization process generally, 399 a search of the relevant literature has
396. Self-amortizing loans are repaid in constant increments composed of both principal
and interest payments, although the proportions of principal and interest vary for each
payment.
397. A loan may combine both self-amortizing and balloon payment features, such as a loan
with a term of five years that follows an amortization schedule such that, if the note were

renewed each five years, the principal would be repaid in full in 30 years.
398. See infra part IV.C.3 for a discussion of other possible ways to structure lien stripping
under Chapter 13 to address the concerns of both lenders and borrowers.
399. See, eg., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J.

LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to CorporateReorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REv. 775 (1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable

Casefor Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); cf Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 117 (1991); Lynn M. LoPucki,
Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to ProfessorsBradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH.

L. REv. 79 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729;
Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992).
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failed to turn up any studies on the narrower question of what impact, if
any, § 1111 (b) has had on the cost of credit to business borrowers. This
may be due to the greater concern in the corporate finance literature with
the relative claims against the corporate enterprise of different classes of
investors and of management, with the negotiating strategies of those
participants and with modeling the highly nuanced financial structure of
major corporations than with studying the impact on a single class of
debt of a single provision of Chapter 11. Furthermore, given the complexity of corporate finance compared with the relative simplicity of the
personal finances of individual debtors, it is unclear how relevant information taken from the corporate reorganization context would be in attempting to assess the impact of lien stripping on the market for home
mortgage credit.'
3.

Chapter 13: Secured creditors other than home mortgage lenders

In its report to Congress in 1973, 41 the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws recommended introducing significant new limitations on the power
of secured creditors in consumer bankruptcy cases.4 2 The recommendations had two objectives: (1) to clarify and make uniform the treatment
of secured creditors in Chapter 13 proceedings; 4 3 and (2) to reduce the
leverage a secured party enjoyed over the debtor when the personal value
of the collateral to the debtor greatly exceeds the resale value of the asset,
as is often the case with property such as household furnishings.'
The
Commission's recommendations remained substantially intact throughout the legislative process, producing a significant shift in negotiating
power away from secured creditors and in favor of Chapter 13 debtors." 5 Consequently, a Chapter 13 debtor may strip down any lien,
other than a mortgage on the debtor's principal residence, subject only to
the obligation to pay the value of the collateral under the plan and to
Among corporate finance articles, see, eg., Julian R. Franks & Walter W. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747 (1989); Robert Gertner &
David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN.
1189 (1991).
400. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 124, at 195-97 (arguing that consumer and business bankruptcy should be understood as parallel systems rather than unified system).
401. H.R. Doc. NO. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1973) (part II).
402. See supra part II.C for a discussion of the legislative history of Chapter 13.
403. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 82, at 601.
404. Aaron, supra note 128, at 25.
405. Some limitations on the power of secured creditors in consumer bankruptcy cases apply in Chapter 7 as well as Chapter 13, such as § 522(0, which provides that the debtor may
ignore a nonpurchase-money security interest in otherwise exempt household goods, or only in
Chapter 7, such as 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988), which permits the debtor to redeem collateral by
paying its value in cash.
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meet the other cramdown standards in § 1325. Hence, a debtor may
strip down a lien on a house if it is a rental property or a second home, or
if it is also secured by other collateral, as well as strip down liens on
chattels such as automobiles.
As in Chapter 12-but unlike Chapter 11-a plan can be confirmed
in Chapter 13 without a vote of the creditors and without reference to the
"absolute priority" rule. A Chapter 13 plan dealing with secured creditors cannot be confirmed unless the secured creditor has voluntarily accepted the plan, the secured creditor retains its lien and is paid over the
term of the plan an amount equal to the present value of the judicially
appraised value of the collateral, or the debtor surrenders the collateral
to the secured creditor." 6 To illustrate the operation of this cramdown
standard with a simplified example, take the case of a Chapter 13 debtor
who purchased a car for $11,000 one year prior to filing for bankruptcy
with a $1000 downpayment and financed the balance with a five-year
loan for $10,000, with an annual interest rate of eighteen percent and a
monthly payment amount of $253.93. Assume that when the debtor files
for bankruptcy, the car is worth only $7000, but is still subject to a debt
of $8,644.57 payable over the remaining term of four years. The debtor's
plan may deal with the auto loan by reducing the amount of the secured
debt to $7000, and if permitted by local precedent and practice, reducing
the interest rate to the then current market rate of twelve percent. Furthermore, if local precedent and practice permit, the debtor may propose
paying little or even nothing at all on the secured lender's unsecured balance of $1644.57. Assuming the debtor is proposing a three-year plan,
the debtor may now purchase the car for thirty-six monthly payments of
only $232.50, resulting in a total savings of $3818.64 compared with the
total scheduled payments due under the original loan.
The relatively generous cramdown standard for all secured creditors
in Chapter 13 other than home mortgage lenders has been in effect since
1979, so interest rates and the terms on which credit is available in affected consumer credit markets should fully reflect the costs imposed on
lenders of this cramdown standard. The operation of consumer credit
markets affected by this cramdown standard should be relevant in estimating the impact of a more generous lien-stripping rule for home mortgages in Chapter 13.
In comparing the cost and availability of home mortgage credit and
consumer credit generally, one important common feature to note is the
growth of "securitization" for both types of credit. The term "securitiza406. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988).
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tion" is often used to refer to the trend toward financial assets being se-

curities rather than loans, or to any borrowing transaction that takes the
form of a securities issuance.'

7

The first loans to be securitized on a

large scale were home mortgages, and the growth of the market for such
securities was pioneered by the governmental or quasi-governmental

agencies starting in the 1970s.101 Although the first securitization transactions involved home mortgages, the process has been reproduced in a
wide variety of contexts, such as automobile loans, credit card receiv-

ables, manufactured housing contracts, unsecured consumer loans, junk
bonds, education loans, commercial real estate mortgages, and boat
loans.' Securitized consumer debt in bankruptcy includes not only se407. Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers,69 Tnx. L. Rlv. 1369, 1374 (1991). Shenker and Colletta propose the
following, more precise definition of securitization:
the sale of equity or debt instruments, representing ownership interests in, or secured
by, a segregated, income-producing asset or pool of assets, in a transaction structure
to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in owning or lending against the underlying assets and to ensure that such interests are more readily marketable and, thus,
more liquid than ownership interests in and loans against the underlying assets.
Id. at 1374-75. Securitization transactions generally involve the following parties: the originator, or the original lender of the assets to be securitized; the issuer of the asset-backed security,
who may or may not be the same as the originator depending on whether the originator has
already sold the assets in the secondary market to a second party; the underwriter, usually an
investment bank that structures the transaction; a credit enhancer such as a bank, surety, or
insurance company who provides credit support through a letter of credit or guarantee that
payments will be made as they become due according to the terms of the securitized obligation;
a trustee, who deals with the issuer, credit enhancer, and servicer on behalf of holders of the
asset-backed securities; a servicer, who might be related to the originator or might be a bank,
who is paid a fee to collect payments due on the underlying assets and pass them on to the
trustee; credit rating agencies, who assess the credit quality of the underlying asset, the structure of the transaction, and the ability of the issuer to segregate the assets backing the securities from its own assets and thus secure an independent (usually higher) credit rating; and
traders, who market the securities to investors and make a secondary market in them. A
securitization transaction involves collecting income-producing assets into a pool and using the
cash flow from the pool to make payments to investors in the asset-backed security. Lowell L.
Bryan,StructuredSecuritized Credit: A Superior Technology for Lending, 1 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 9 (1988); Shenker & Colletta, supra, at 1376.
408. See supra part IV.A.1 for a discussion of the development of the secondary market for
mortgage-backed securities.
409. Craig J. Goldberg & Karen Rogers, An Introduction to Asset Backed Securities, 1 J.
APPLIED CORP.FIN. 20 (1988). Representative John J.LaFalce, a democrat from New York
state has repeatedly sponsored legislation that would create a "Venture Enhancement and
Loan Development Administration for Small, Undercapitalized Enterprises," to be known as
Velda Sue, that would securitize small business loans. Such legislation may have a better
chance of succeeding under the Clinton Administration than it had under the Bush Administration. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Secondary Market Is Sought, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1993,
at D1.
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cured claims, such as automobile loans or home mortgages, but also unsecured claims such as credit card debt.4" °
Securitization of automobile loans and credit card receivables developed in the early 1980s, 4 1 ' after the development of the market for mort-

gage-backed securities and after the revision of the bankruptcy law and
enactment of the more generous cramdown provisions of Chapter 13.
Thus, the possibility that consumers will file for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding has been a component of default risk that issuers and investors in securitized consumer debts have been forced to deal with since
these markets developed. In most cases securitized debt is composed of
large numbers of small, standardized assets, so that the credit risk of
such a security can be estimated by statistical analysis of the assets in the
pool. As long as the impact of any given legal rule regarding the allocation of losses following default by borrowers in the underlying pool of
assets is statistically predictable, the credit-rating service or guarantor
can predict the impact of such a rule on the overall credit risk of the
securitized asset, and investors can adjust the price of the securitized asset accordingly.
Techniques developed in the market for asset-backed securities for
dealing with higher levels of default risk-whether due to bankruptcy
law, state law debtor protections, or any other factor, such as a regional
economic downturn-include permitting issuers to increase reserves
against possible default and requiring the participation of a credit enhancer in the transaction. An issuer from a jurisdiction or a region experiencing higher-than-average losses on the securitized assets can set
aside larger-than-average reserves in order to overcollateralize the security, and also can pay for the credit enhancement of a bank, surety, or
insurance company in order to assure the marketability of its assetbacked securities. Thus the greater risk of loss through more generous
debtor protection under bankruptcy law or state law need not foreclose
potential borrowers or lenders from participation in national credit mar410. Although securitization has grown explosively in recent decades, it has by no means
displaced other forms of consumer lending. The amount of securitized consumer credit as a
percentage of all consumer credit varies from as much as 35% for home mortgage lending to
as little as 10-12% for automobile loans or credit card receivables. Bryan, supra note 407, at 6.
The following discussion will focus on securitized consumer debt rather than traditional lending by financial intermediaries, however, because of the growing importance of this type of
debt and also because structural parallels between asset-backed securities and mortgagebacked securities facilitate the comparison of the two forms of consumer credit.
411. STANDARD & POOR'S CORP., supra note 283, at 61.
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kets. Access to national markets for credit, however, is conditioned on
4 12
payment of an appropriate risk premium.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Nobelman, the Supreme Court resolved the question of how
much special protection Chapter 13's antimodification provision granted

to mortgage lenders with a lien on the debtor's primary residence. The
narrow reasoning of the Court's opinion focused on "rights of holders"
rather than "secured claim" in determining what interest was protected
from modification. This interpretation is problematic because it undermines the function of § 506(a) in forcing lenders to face changed economic circumstances, and it undermines the benefit of the bankruptcy
discharge for consumer debtors. Not only is the holding in Nobelman
not dictated by the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code provisions at
issue, it is not clearly mandated by the legislative history of the relevant
provisions.
While the issue was not framed by the Supreme Court in these
terms, the dispute in Nobelman is ultimately one of balancing the competing federal policies of granting consumer debtors a fresh start following bankruptcy and of encouraging home ownership through federal
support for mortgage lenders. Lenders contended that permitting home
mortgages to be stripped down would interfere with the operation of
mortgage markets and choke off the free flow of credit to borrowers.
Consumer advocates countered that there was no evidence that lien stripping had those effects. This Article has demonstrated that lenders other
than home mortgage lenders routinely cope with lien stripping, and
many home mortgage lenders cope with antideficiency statutes, so primary and secondary markets for mortgages should also be capable of
adjusting to a regime that is more accommodating to debtors.4 13
The compromise reached in Chapter 11 between the interests of secured creditors and borrowers reflected in the § I111(b) election is not
available to home mortgage lenders and homeowners in Chapter 13 because of the different structure of a typical home mortgage compared
with a typical commercial real property mortgage. Generalizing from
412. If retail markets for consumer credit are imperfect, however, the terms on which consumers are offered credit may not take account of small gradations in risk. If retail markets
offer credit only on certain standardized terms, and potential borrowers who do not qualify
under those terms cannot individually bargain for credit on terms that reflect their riskier
credit status, then those more risky borrowers may in fact be cut off from conventional sources
of credit as a result of standardization of credit terms.
413. Of course, the costs associated with the transition to such a system might be greater
than the costs of routine administration once the change in liability has been accomplished.
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the evidence of the impact of cramdown in Chapters 12 and 13 on secured lenders, however, it is apparent that permitting lien stripping on a
uniform national basis through federal bankruptcy law would have some
impact on price and terms of home mortgage credit, but is not likely to
have the profound impact lenders alleged. Therefore, the holding in
Nobelman was not dictated by economic necessity any more than it was
dictated by the canons of statutory interpretation.
The holding in Nobelman tacitly supports both a particular interpretation of how best to achieve the federal policy of promoting home
ownership, and a particular interpretation of how to balance the in rem
rights of creditors in bankruptcy with the economic benefits of a bankruptcy discharge for consumer debtors. In considering revisions to the
relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions, however, Congress may decide to
strike a different balance between the rights of mortgage lenders and consumer debtors in bankruptcy.
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